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Abstract
We study the impact of Central Bank intervention on the process of price
formation in currency markets. We use a unique dataset of tick-by-tick in-
dicative quotes posted by dealers on Reuters terminals and of intraday ster-
ilized spot interventions and customer transactions executed on behalf of the
Swiss National Bank (SNB) on the Swiss Franc/U.S. Dollar exchange rate
(CHFUSD) between 1986 and 1998. We find that potentially informative
SNB interventions (but not ex post uninformative customer transactions),
although small relative to daily trading volumes in the CHFUSD market,
had significant and persistent (albeit asymmetric, depending on their sign)
eﬀects on daily currency returns, especially when (relatively) large in mag-
nitude, expected by the market, or inconsistent with existing momentum.
The market did not anticipate the occurrence of incoming interventions un-
less if chasing the trend. The SNB was much less successful in smoothing
fluctuations of the currency, for daily CHFUSD volatility always surged in
proximity of interventions, as did average absolute and proportional spreads.
Decomposition of estimated absolute spread shocks also reveals that SNB ac-
tions induced misinformation among market participants, impacted trading
immediacy, and increased market liquidity and competition among dealers.
Many of these changes translated into higher transaction costs borne by the
population of investors.
JEL classification: E58; F31; G15
Keywords: Sterilized Central Bank Intervention; Market Microstructure;
Foreign Exchange; Information; Inventory
1 Introduction
Central Bank interventions are one of the most interesting and puzzling fea-
tures of the global foreign exchange (forex) markets. More often than usually
believed, domestic monetary authorities engage in individual or coordinated
eﬀorts to influence exchange rate dynamics. The need to strengthen or resist
an existing trend in a key currency rate, to calm disorderly market condi-
tions, to signal current or future stances of economic policy, or to replenish
previously depleted foreign exchange reserve holdings are among the most
frequently mentioned reasons for this kind of operations.
There is strong consensus in the economic literature (e.g., Adams and
Henderson (1983)) that unsterilized interventions, by aﬀecting the existing
stock of high-powered money, influence the exchange rate through the tradi-
tional channels of monetary policy. The eﬀectiveness and necessity of ster-
ilized interventions, i.e., accompanied by oﬀsetting actions on the domestic
monetary base, is instead still controversial, and, as such, at the center of
the current theoretical and empirical debate.1
Within the macroeconomic approach, sterilized intervention may aﬀect
the exchange rate through either of two channels, imperfect substitutability
and signaling. The first channel is usually examined in the context of portfolio
balance models of exchange rate determination (e.g., Branson (1983, 1984)),
in which market participants, being risk-averse, need to be compensated for
holding positions they would have not otherwise kept in their portfolios,
had the intervention not occurred. The second channel of influence (Mussa
(1981), Bhattacharya and Weller (1997)) allows sterilized intervention to
aﬀect quotes and transaction prices by conveying not only information on
policy intentions but also fundamental information about the future value of
the currency.2
Regardless of their eﬀectiveness, the presence of active price manipulators
in the otherwise very liquid and (widely recognized as) eﬃcient forex markets
also raises another question of common interest to analysts, researchers, and
policy-makers. How do transactions executed on behalf of the Central Bank
1For example, many authors (e.g., Taylor (1982)) emphasize how costly these operations
are, especially with respect to their immediate, albeit rarely long-lasting, desired eﬀects.
The survey article by Sarno and Taylor (2001) oﬀers a detailed account of this debate.
2Much of the existing empirical literature on imperfect substitutability (see Edison
(1993) for a review) finds that portfolio balance eﬀects of oﬃcial interventions on the
exchange rate are only small and short-lived. More recently however, Evans and Lyons
(2001) show that even sterilized, secret, and uninformative Central Bank interventions
may have an impact on the exchange rate if they generate interdealer order flow. Stronger
supporting evidence is available for the signaling channel, e.g., Dominguez (1987) and
Kaminsky and Lewis (1996).
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aﬀect the process of price formation in the currency market and, in particu-
lar, not just exchange rate returns but return volatility, the market’s ability
to process information, and investors’ ability to trade? Many recent market
microstructure studies focus on each of these issues separately, and suggest
that such transactions might significantly aﬀect exchange rate returns, mar-
ket volatility, or liquidity.3 However, the available empirical evidence, often
based on currency data collected just on daily basis (hence, not necessarily
representative of the dynamics of market quotes, spreads, and daily variabil-
ity), and in many cases just on second-hand information about the timing,
direction, or size of oﬃcial interventions, oﬀers only mixed support for these
claims. The same evidence also does not appear to be suﬃcient to assess
the relative importance of inventory versus risk-aversion versus information
asymmetry considerations in explaining the estimated eﬀects of the actions
of a Central Bank on the process of price formation in the forex markets.
In this study, we explore all these research questions in a comprehensive
manner. Indeed, the novelty of this paper is in considering a broader perspec-
tive in which we ask not only whether interventions are eventually eﬀective
but also whether they impact exchange rate volatility, market liquidity, and
transaction costs in a significant way independently of their eﬀectiveness, and
how those eﬀects interact with each other in proximity of their occurrence.
To that purpose, we investigate all sterilized spot interventions and customer
transactions executed by the Swiss National Bank (SNB), the Swiss Central
Bank, on the Swiss Franc/U.S. Dollar exchange rate (CHFUSD) between
January 2, 1986 and December 31, 1998. The CHFUSD is among the most
liquid currency pairs traded in the global forex markets, and the SNB is one
of the most active and credible monetary authorities in the financial world.
Although oﬃcial interventions may be informative about economic fun-
damentals and policy intentions, customer transactions are not, as they are
instead conducted for reasons other than exchange rate management. Hence,
we utilize them as a control sample to evaluate the relevance of information
and inventory-based theories of the impact of Central Bank interventions on
currency returns, return volatility, and transaction costs. We then build a
database matching SNB actions with tick-by-tick quotes posted by dealers
on Reuters terminals and recorded by Olsen & Associates. Albeit purely in-
dicative, those bid and ask prices are often utilized in the literature to proxy
for the dynamics of (generally unavailable) transaction rates and eﬀective
spreads on over-the-counter forex markets like the one for the CHFUSD. We
3An albeit incomplete list of such papers includes Kaminsky and Lewis (1996),
Dominguez (1998, 1999), Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000),
Evans and Lyons (2001), Pasquariello (2001a), and Payne and Vitale (2001).
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use these intraday quotes to compute daily measures of exchange rate behav-
ior, ex post volatility, market liquidity, and trading intensity. We work with
daily aggregations to investigate the lower-frequency impact of intraday SNB
trades on any such variable, hence to bridge both the macro and microstruc-
ture literatures on Central Bank intervention, along the lines of Evans and
Lyons (2002).
When we analyze these transactions with event-study methodology, we
find that oﬃcial SNB interventions, despite accounting for only a small por-
tion of the average daily turnover in the CHFUSD market, significantly af-
fected each of the variables of interest in both the short- and the long-term.
Oﬃcial interventions have persistent eﬀects on currency returns, lasting for
several days after being executed, especially when (relatively) large in magni-
tude, expected by the market, or inconsistent with existing momentum. The
market did not anticipate the occurrence of incoming interventions unless if
chasing the trend. The Swiss monetary authority was much less successful in
calming disorderly market conditions by reducing exchange rate variability.
Ex post measures of currency volatility in fact always surged in proximity
of its interventions and stayed high for many days afterwards. Absolute and
proportional spreads for the CHFUSD were also aﬀected prior to SNB oﬃcial
transactions. For example, we estimate that (annualized) transaction costs
borne by investors and speculators increased by around $100 to over $400
million in days when the SNB was selling USD, while they decreased on aver-
age by $150 to $640 million when the Swiss monetary authority was engaged
in USD purchases. Changes would be of even greater magnitude if computed
on a cumulative basis over wider event windows. Many of these eﬀects were
found to be statistically or economically negligible when (ex post uninfor-
mative) customer transactions were examined, suggesting that the potential
information content of SNB interventions must have played an important
role in explaining their impact on the CHFUSD market.
To further explore these issues, we extend the model of Fedenia and Gram-
matikos (1992) to decompose daily shocks in transaction costs at or around
the time of SNB trades into shocks related to misinformation, liquidity, fun-
damental volatility, competition, and immediacy. This analysis reveals that
oﬃcial interventions (especially if big in size or expected by the market) in-
duced greater heterogeneity of beliefs among market participants, impacted
significantly trading immediacy and ex post exchange rate variation (except
if chasing the trend), and increased market liquidity and competition among
dealers for the incoming orders. Many of these changes were costly, i.e., trans-
lated into higher transaction costs borne by the population of investors, even
when the interventions were not eﬀective in reversing the existing market
momentum or in smoothing fluctuations of the exchange rate.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our unique dataset
and its basic features. In Section 3 a detailed analysis of the behavior of
currency returns, return volatility, and market liquidity is performed using
event-study methodology. Specification of a model to identify sources of
shocks to absolute and proportional spreads in proximity of Central Bank
trades and its estimation for SNB activity are in Section 4. In Section 5
we consider the issue of whether the magnitude of the intervention, its sign
with respect to existing market momentum, or the degree of surprise ac-
companying it are relevant in explaining some of the main findings of this
study. Finally, in Section 6 we summarize our results and outline potential
extensions of our work.
2 Data
In this study we use two basic datasets. The first contains transactions
conducted by the SNB on the CHFUSD exchange rate between 1986 and
1998. The second includes tick-by-tick indicative bid and ask quotes on
CHFUSD posted on the FXFX Reuters screen over the same sample period.
In the next two subsections, a more accurate description of the available data
is provided, and their main features and properties are investigated.
2.1 Central Bank transactions
Most of the existing empirical research on the impact of interventions on
quotes and spreads utilizes exclusively daily or weekly amounts of domestic
currency negotiated in secret (hence unbeknownst to many market partic-
ipants) by the corresponding Central Bank. Further information on these
transactions, e.g., time of execution or settlement price, is also generally
unavailable. Therefore, to control for any discrepancy between actual and
reported interventions and to shed more light on the eﬀects of such actions in
the forex markets, some authors attempt to construct time series of interven-
tions using the history of newswire reports generated by information networks
like Reuters, as in the case of Dominguez (1999). However, as pointed out by
Osterberg and Wetmore Humes (1995), among others, media reports on in-
terventions are often less than accurate. Hence, the resulting series of events
may depend crucially on the selected sources and on the criteria adopted to
filter the relevant news. In order to study the impact of interventions on
the daily process of price formation in the currency markets, this paper uses
a collection of all intraday spot, ex post heralded transactions conducted by
the SNB on CHFUSD between 1986 and 1998. A detailed description and
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preliminary analysis of this dataset can be found in Fischer and Zurlinden
(1999). Trades executed on behalf of the SNB in the spot forex markets can
be of two types, interventions and customer transactions.
It is rather infrequent, according to the available evidence, that a do-
mestic monetary authority would not sterilize its actions in the forex market
with oﬀsetting open market trades to preserve its previous stance of mone-
tary policy. As mentioned earlier, current empirical and theoretical work on
Central Bank intervention concentrates mainly on sterilized currency trans-
actions, and on the puzzling issue of why they appear to be often eﬀective,
at least in the short term. We focus our attention on sterilized interventions
in this research as well. The Swiss Central Bank resumed its attempts at
managing the fluctuations of the CHF in November 1986, after a three-year
break, and ended them in December 1995. The SNB did not intervene be-
tween 1996 and 1998. According to Fischer and Zurlinden (1999, p. 664),
the SNB intervened principally “to aﬀect the trend of the exchange rate or to
counteract market disturbances,” although in some instances solidarity with
other Central Banks may have represented an important motive as well. Not
surprisingly indeed, most of the SNB interventions in the dataset were not
only sterilized and ex ante unannounced but also coordinated, i.e., in most
cases the Bundesbank and/or the Federal Reserve intervened on the same
day and in the same direction as the SNB. There were only three days when
the SNB acted alone in the CHFUSD market, and in such circumstances it
did not neutralize in full the eﬀect of its actions on domestic liquidity. We
therefore remove those days from the sample.4
Customer transactions are purchases and sales of USD triggered by the
Swiss government’s requests for foreign and domestic currency. For example,
when the government needs U.S. Dollars, the SNB supplies it with the desired
amount by reducing its USD holdings. This leads to a steady outflow of
dollars from the SNB’s reserves. Thus, the SNB defines customer transactions
as all transactions conducted in order to replenish (usually not immediately,
but only after some time) its foreign exchange reserve holdings depleted by
the actions of the true customer (the government), i.e., more generally as all
transactions motivated by reasons other than exchange rate management.
Immediately after its transaction is concluded, the SNB informs the coun-
terparty of the nature of the trade, i.e., whether the sale or the purchase of
CHF represents an intervention. Fischer and Zurlinden observe that the in-
tervention announcement spreads rapidly across the market and is eventually
picked up by news agencies and mentioned in their newswire reports. It is
4The dates when unsterilized SNB interventions occurred are December 27, 1989 and
March 6 and 11, 1992.
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then reasonable to assume that dealers experience no diﬃculties in identifying
the SNB as a counterparty and, together with all other market participants,
in distinguishing interventions from customer transactions after they have
been executed. It is also reasonable to assume that customer transactions
should be considered ex post uninformative.
For each transaction, the SNB reports the amounts traded, the negotiated
price, and the (Zurich) time of occurrence, rounded to the nearest minute.
The time stamp corresponds to when the trade slip was filled out, i.e., im-
mediately after the deal is concluded. All available data refer to a single
transaction executed at the given time by the SNB with a single dealer. Ne-
gotiated prices are based on market exchange rates, for the SNB does not
act as a market-maker. SNB does most of its forex transactions with local
banks, including local branches of foreign intermediaries, i.e., in Zurich but
not in London or New York.5 Each dealer/counterparty does not know the
total amount of the intervention/customer transaction (if it is composed of
several transactions with more traders on the same day).
In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics on intraday SNB interventions,
Iti, and customer transactions, Cti, where i is the i-th trade on day t and
transacted amounts are in millions of U.S. Dollars. In Table 2 we aggregate
and summarize the SNB activity on a daily basis. The SNB intervened 709
times over 102 days, and executed 555 customer transactions over 326 days.6
Although SNB-originated trades went in both directions, about two-thirds of
the interventions were dollar sales, while most of the customer transactions
are made of dollar purchases, as expected. Consequently, mean and median
intervention (customer transaction) size are negative (positive) at the intra-
day and daily level. In addition, the quantities Iti and Cti are negatively
and positively skewed, respectively, but are both leptokurtic. Positive and
negative intraday interventions and customer transactions have the same me-
dian size ($10 million). However, Iti < 0 and Cti > 0 are more dispersed in
magnitude. Daily aggregated interventions (It) are greater on average than
customer transactions (Ct) of the same sign, but both represent only a very
small fraction of the mean daily turnover in the CHFUSD market (around
$80 billion, as estimated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS,
1999)).7 Customer transactions seem to be less concentrated on particular
5In few cases, in 1997 and 1998, the SNB executed some customer transactions (for a
total of 2.34% of the sample) via the Electronic Brokerage System (EBS) in London.
6We discard three days, June 27, 1986, July 24, 1986, and January 19, 1987, in which
the Swiss Central Bank bought dollars to replenish its reserves of hard currency, but for
which we have no corresponding tick-by-tick indicative quotes on the CHFUSD.
7The BIS (1999) triennial survey of currency market activity for 1998 reports that
about $1.5 trillion in transactions are executed in the global forex market every day, of
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days. There instead appears to be some clustering of intervention events on
Fridays. Interventions also typically hit a greater number of dealers, although
with much smaller mean intraday volumes. Indeed, the average number of
interventions per day is significantly higher than the corresponding number
of customer transactions (6.95 versus 1.70). This suggests that the SNB
attempted to achieve the maximum visibility for its intervention actions ei-
ther by splitting the planned daily amounts over more intraday trades or by
executing more transactions during the same day.
Figure 1 oﬀers a glimpse of the intraday patterns of SNB actions emerg-
ing from the sample. The graph displays the number of interventions and
customer transactions over fifteen minute-intervals from 5 a.m. to 4 p.m.
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). Most of the interventions appear to occur
between 6 and 10 a.m. or between 12:30 and 3 p.m. GMT. The number of
Iti peaks in the Zurich afternoon (around 1 p.m. GMT) at the opening of
the New York market, that is when coordinated intervention with the Federal
Reserve is more likely to take place. Customer transactions are characterized
by a similar pattern, but are more frequent during the Zurich morning.8
2.2 CHFUSD quotes
The foreign exchange market is probably the most active financial market in
the world, in terms of volume, frequency, and intensity of trading. Pasquar-
iello (2001a) discusses in detail the main characteristics of the global cur-
rency markets and its diﬀerences with most equity and futures markets.
Trading activity in exchange rates is decentralized and, as emphasized by
Hsieh and Kleidon (1996), occurs 24 hours a day over three main regional
markets: Tokyo, London, and New York. The closing hours of the Asian
markets overlap with the opening of London, Frankfurt, and Zurich. The
overlap is more substantial between European and American trading activ-
ity. The main players in the forex markets are dealers, brokers, and cus-
tomers. Currency dealers are generally large and medium-sized commercial
and investment banks, whose other business activities might also require ex-
tensive currency transactions. Those institutions operate as dealers, trading
on their own accounts with each other as well as with non-bank customers,
including institutional investors, hedge funds, big and small corporations,
which approximately 5% is explained by trading in the CHFUSD.
8In addition, Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) argue that the pattern exhibited by the
SNB interventions in Figure 1 seems to mimic the intraday fluctuations in trading volume
documented for example by Müller et al. (1990), thus suggesting that the Swiss monetary
authority does not attempt to manage the fluctuations of the CHFUSD when trading is
thin.
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and multinational firms. Brokers instead simply bring together dealers who
wish to buy or sell the foreign currency. Dealers indicate their willingness
to trade by posting quotes on electronic news systems provided by outside
vendors like Reuters, Telerate, or Knight Ridder. However, those prices do
not commit the dealer to execution. Dealers also quote on demand a bid or
ask price for the currencies they deal with, and are required to transact at
the proposed rates. Actual transactions are completed privately or through
electronic communication, as in the Reuters 2000 Dealing System. Hence, in-
formation regarding transaction prices and volumes is proprietary and known
exclusively to the parties involved in the transaction.
The raw exchange rate dataset used in this study consists of all continu-
ously recorded quotes for CHFUSD appeared on the interbank Reuters FXFX
screen between January 2, 1986 and December 31, 1998. These prices have
been collected by Olsen & Associates using in-house real-time data retrieval
software. Each of the available quotes contains a bid price (Btn), an ask price
(Atn), and the (GMT) time when it first appeared on the Reuters terminals,
rounded to the nearest second. Such quotes are irregularly spaced in time,
simply indicative (i.e., non-binding), and plagued by many microstructure
frictions (e.g., clustering of the posted bid-ask spreads and strategic quote
positioning) which have been extensively studied in the literature.9 As sug-
gested by Andersen et al. (2002), these frictions, although typically relevant
over intraday intervals, become immaterial when analyzing longer-horizon
aggregates. In this study, we intend to evaluate the impact of SNB inter-
ventions and customer transactions on the process of price formation in the
CHFUSD market. To accomplish this task, while controlling for the dis-
tortions that those microstructure features of the data may induce to the
statistical analysis, we therefore choose to focus our investigation on daily
measures of exchange rate behavior, ex post volatility, market liquidity, and
trading intensity constructed using the available intraday quotes.
The data are first filtered to eliminate extreme outliers and rates at which
it was extremely unlikely that a transaction would have occurred, using the
procedure recommended by Dacorogna et al. (1993). Along the lines of
Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) and Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), we also
remove all prices recorded during weekends and during the Asian daylight
hours (9 p.m. to 5 a.m. GMT) from the dataset, as trading activity over
9See, for example, Bessembinder (1994) and Hasbrouck (1999) for an analysis of cluster-
ing in indicative quotes on DEMUSD. Bollerslev and Melvin (1994) suggest that reputation
eﬀects may prevent the posting of quotes at which a bank would not subsequently be will-
ing to trade. Goodhart et al. (1996) and Dominguez (1999) compare those quotes with
short sample of spot transactions and find that intraday indicative spreads overestimate
the magnitude of transacted spreads and the relevance of clustering.
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those periods is significantly slower, and many fewer quotes are posted on the
FXFX page. In the end, we eliminate about 11% of the original observations,
but still remain with slightly less than 6.3 million validated intraday quotes.
As in Müller et al. (1990) and Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), we define
the n-th tick-by-tick midquote return for day t, rtn, as the diﬀerence between
the midpoint of the logarithmic bid and ask at the n-th and (n−1)-th quotes
on day t,
rtn =
1
2
[ln (Btn) + ln (Atn)]−
1
2
£
ln
¡
Btn−1
¢
+ ln
¡
Atn−1
¢¤
. (1)
This definition of midquote return has the advantage of being symmetric
with respect to the denomination of the exchange rate, that is with respect to
whether we focus on CHFUSD or on USDCHF. However, the return numbers
generated from Eq. (1) are only negligibly diﬀerent from the usual log-
returns ensuing from the more conventional midquote 1
2
(Btn +Atn). We
then specify the tick-by-tick bid-ask spread on an absolute and relative basis
as Stn = (Atn −Btn)× 10, 000 (i.e., in units of basis points) and, consistent
with Eq. (1), stn = ln (Atn)−ln (Btn), respectively. In particular, the variable
stn, the logarithmic spread of the last valid price before tn, again suggested
by Müller et al. (1990), is a good proxy for the proportional spread. We also
compute tick-by-tick absolute returns, |rtn|, tick-by-tick duration dtn as the
length of time (in seconds) between consecutive quotes, and the frequency
variable ft as the number of posted quotes over day t of the sample.
Finally, we define the cumulative return and absolute return over day
t, rt and |rt|, as the cumulated sum of the tick-by-tick returns computed
according to Eq. (1), i.e., rt =
ftP
n=1
rtn and |rt| =
ftP
n=1
|rtn |, respectively. The
daily absolute return |rt| is a first proxy not only for market volatility, as in
Payne and Vitale (2001), but also for the intensity of informational events
and information shocks, as suggested by Chordia et al. (2000). We also
define an additional proxy for daily realized exchange rate volatility, the
square return measure r2t , by computing the cumulated sum of all intraday
square returns r2tn , that is r
2
t =
ftP
n=1
r2tn . Andersen et al. (2002) show that,
under suitable conditions, the ex post realized quadratic variation at time
t, r2t , representing the realized sample path variation of the square return
process r2tn , is an unbiased estimator of daily return volatility conditional
on information at time t − 1 which is asymptotically free of measurement
error. Finally, we define St, st, and dt as the arithmetic means of their
corresponding tick-by-tick series of absolute spread Stn, logarithmic spread
stn, and duration dtn over day t.
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Table 3 collects some basic descriptive statistics for each of those vari-
ables over 3,352 trading days. The cumulated daily CHFUSD return rt is
characterized by a mean of zero, little or no skewness, and strong and sig-
nificant leptokurtosis. The first-order estimated autocorrelation (bρ1) is small
and statistically indistinguishable from zero, but the computed value for
the Ljung-Box portmanteau test for up to the fifth-order serial correlation,
LB (5), rejects the null hypothesis that returns are white noise. Both the
proxies for return volatility (|rt| and r2t ) and the frequency of arrivals of new
quotes (ft) show instead strong positive linear dependence. On average, al-
most 1,900 new quotes are posted every day by dealers on the FXFX page of
the Reuters terminals. Figure 2, which plots the mean daily frequency ft over
each of the years in the sample, reveals an increasing trend in this variable.
This renewed interest in the CHFUSD occurs in correspondence with the pro-
cess of convergence of most EU currencies approaching the deadline for the
Monetary Union, and the resulting increasing correlation among them. The
average duration between consecutive new indicative quotes (dt) is roughly
one minute. The corresponding estimated skewness and kurtosis are very
large, and do not seem to be compatible with a Gaussian distribution. The
mean absolute spread is about 9.43 basis points. The mean proportional
bid-ask spread is small, around 0.066%, with respect to the values usually
observed in most equity markets, an additional point in support of the often
mentioned high liquidity of the global exchange rate markets. The parameterbρ1 and the statistic LB (5) are positive and statistically significant for both
St and st.
The evidence of positive autocorrelation for most of the variables in the
sample suggests the presence of weekday cycles of activity in the CHFUSD
market. To explore this possibility, Figure 3 displays means of daily values
for rt, |rt|, r2t , St, st, and ft, and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals,
computed over diﬀerent days of the week. Average cumulated returns rt
(Figure 3a) are never significantly diﬀerent from zero unless on Thursdays.
All other variables instead show meaningful weekday patterns. In particular,
our proxies for exchange rate volatility, |rt| and r2t (Figures 3b and 3c), tend
to be much higher by the end of the trading week, and so do absolute and
logarithmic spreads (Figures 3d and 3e), while many more quotes appear
to be posted by dealers on the FXFX page on Tuesdays and Wednesdays
(Figure 3f).
Overall, and consistent with other studies on similar time series, the
CHFUSD market features economically and statistically significant daily pe-
riodicity in the volatility of the traded asset, in market activity, and in the
transaction costs that dealers charge to investors and banks as a compen-
sation for providing their liquidity services. Market microstructure theory
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traditionally relates the seasonal dynamics of these variables to inventory
control considerations, asymmetric information between dealers and profit-
maximizing speculators, and order processing.10 Aware of these properties
of the our dataset, in the next sections we investigate whether (and how) the
actions of a particular type of trader, a Central Bank engaged in currency
management, may aﬀect not only currency returns but also exchange rate
volatility and market liquidity.
3 Seasonalities, long-term trends, and the es-
timated impact of intervention
In this section we analyze the eﬀect, if any, of Central Bank-originated trades
on the process of price formation in the CHFUSD market by merging the
dataset of indicative quotes posted on the Reuters FXFX page from January
2, 1986 to December 31, 1998 with the collection of oﬃcial interventions and
customer transactions executed on behalf of the SNB over the same period of
time. The resulting joint database contains tick-by-tick validated quotes, the
daily variables rt, |rt|, r2t , St, st, ft, and dt (defined in Section 2.2), and the
intraday and daily aggregated transactions involving the SNB (described in
Section 2.1). There are 86 days in the sample when only oﬃcial interventions
(I) were observed. In 18 of them the SNB purchased USD (I > 0), while
selling it in the remaining 68 (I < 0). Customer transactions (C) were
more frequent. There are 310 days in which they occurred, of which 298 are
characterized exclusively by dollar purchases (C > 0), and just 12 by dollar
sales (C < 0). There are also 16 days in which the SNB bought dollars both
for oﬃcial intervention purposes and as pure customer transactions (I&C).
Customer transactions are very important for this research because they are
not supposed to be informative ex post, hence will be used as a control sample
to verify the relevance of information considerations to any estimated eﬀect
of oﬃcial interventions on the variables of interest.
To evaluate the economic and statistical significance of the impact of SNB
trades on currency returns, market liquidity, and exchange rate volatility, two
very important issues must be addressed. First, does any long-term trend in
the absolute and logarithmic spread, absolute and square return, duration
and frequency of the posted quotes aﬀect the dynamics of those variables
at or around the time when the SNB was executing oﬃcial interventions or
10O’Hara (1995) provides a comprehensive review of the market microstructure litera-
ture dealing with issues associated with inventory and information economics, while the
monograph of Lyons (2001) reinterprets and extends many of these issues in the context
of forex markets.
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customer transactions? In our sample, none of the subcategories of SNB ac-
tions is concentrated over any particular day or during any particular month
of the sample. Nonetheless, intervention events (but not customer trans-
actions) happen more frequently on Tuesdays and Fridays, and especially
before 1990, thus raising some concern about weekday and long-run cycles
in SNB activity.
Most of the variables in our dataset are characterized by pronounced tem-
poral trends as well.11 For example, in Figure 2 we showed that the mean
daily number of posted quotes ft has been increasing over the last 10 years
of the sample. So do both the realized volatility r2t and cumulated absolute
returns, while daily cumulated returns rt do not appear to display any dis-
cernible trend during the same time-frame. The average duration between
consecutive new posted quotes instead drops from about 100 seconds in 1986
to less than 50 seconds in 1998. Although the mean proportional spread fluc-
tuates swiftly over the sample period, average daily absolute spreads decline
steadily from 1986 to 1996, albeit recovering somewhat in 1997 and 1998.
Furthermore, the analysis of Section 2.2 revealed statistically robust week-
day seasonalities for many of those variables. Clearly, these results show the
need to control explicitly for short-term seasonalities and long-term trends
in assessing the impact of Central Bank activity on the dynamics of the
CHFUSD exchange rate.
Second, there is some empirical evidence, e.g., Payne and Vitale (2001),
that market participants tend to anticipate oﬃcial interventions. Addition-
ally, most of the theoretical and empirical debate surrounding Central Bank
intervention, the most recent example of which is Evans and Lyons (2001), is
centered around the issue of establishing whether any of the eﬀects of those
actions are of permanent or of just temporary nature. It is thus of interest to
determine whether exchange rate volatility increases or decreases prior to oﬃ-
cial interventions, how early currency dealers modify their posted quotes and
spreads in response to expectations of future SNB actions, and finally how
persistent these changes in CHFUSD returns, volatility, and market liquidity
are in the days immediately following the SNB-originated transactions.
Both these sets of questions we tackle by specifying, for each daily aggre-
gated variable of interest Xt (from rt to ft) and for the set of events of type
h, the following two basic regressions:
Xt = α+
2P
l=1
γlXt−l + δ0It (0, h) +
4P
i=1
ψiDt (i) +
1997P
k=1986
ϑkYt (k) + εt (2)
11For economy of exposition, these trends are not reported here, but are available on
request from the author.
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and
Xt = α+
2P
l=1
γlXt−l +
KP
j=−K
δjIt (j, h) +
4P
i=1
ψiDt (i) +
1997P
k=1986
ϑkYt (k) + εt (3)
where h = I, I > 0, I < 0, C, C > 0, C < 0, or I&C, and It (j, h) is an
unsigned event dummy variable equal to 1 in day t if during day t + j the
SNB was executing a transaction of type h, and equal to zero otherwise. The
use of unsigned dummies allows us to explore the possibility of asymmetric
impact of purchases and sale of USD by the SNB on any Xt. Nonetheless,
in the special case in which Xt = rt and h = I, C, or I&C, we substitute
the regressor It (j, h) with the signed event dummy I∗t (j, h) equal to 1 (-1)
if the SNB was executing a purchase (sale) of USD of type h during day
t+ j, and equal to zero otherwise, to prevent the estimation of Eqs. (2) and
(3) from averaging across eﬀects of opposite sign. For i = 1 (Monday), ..., 4
(Thursday), Dt (i) is a day-of-the-week dummy, while Yt (k) is a year dummy,
for k = 1986, ..., 1997. Eqs. (2) and (3) also include lags of Xt of order 1
and 2 to control for the autocorrelation in the dependent variables found in
Table 3. In order to accommodate heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
issues, we estimate those regressions using a standard GMM procedure and
compute Newey-West standard errors.
How do we interpret the resulting coeﬃcients’ estimates? The coeﬃcient
for the contemporaneous indicator It (0, h) (or I∗t (0, h)), δ0 in Eq. (2), is a
proxy for the impact of the event of type h on Xt at time t, after accounting
for weekday patterns and any long-term trend in the variable. The same
coeﬃcient δ0 for j = 0 in Eq. (3) becomes a measure of the marginal revision
of the cumulated impact of the signed action on Xt up to (but not including)
time t. If instead j > 0, the coeﬃcient on It (j, h) (or I∗t (j, h)), δj, is a
measure of anticipation, i.e., of the marginal impact of the action of type h
on the variable at time t before that action actually occurs at time t+j. Vice
versa, if j < 0, the coeﬃcient δj is a measure of persistence, i.e., a measure
of the marginal impact of the same action type h on the variable at time
t after that action has already occurred at time t + j. Hence, successively
cumulated sums bξh−w of the event-dummy coeﬃcients of this regression can
be interpreted as measures of the cumulated impact of the action h under
examination on the corresponding variable up to day t − w. Thus, if for
example h = I, Xt = St, and w > 0 (w < 0), then bξh−w = 8P
j=w
bδj is an estimate
of the cumulated impact of oﬃcial SNB interventions on the absolute spread
up to |w| days before (after) interventions of type I occur.
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3.1 Marginal impact of SNB actions
We first report estimates of the coeﬃcient δ0 in Eq. (2) for each of the vari-
ables of interest in Table 4. The most striking result there displayed is that,
after controlling for its short and long-term trends, exchange rate volatility,
as measured both by the absolute return |rt| and the realized conditional
variation r2t , increases following both oﬃcial purchases and sales of USD on
behalf of the SNB. Hence, interventions by the Swiss monetary authority
on the CHFUSD appear to increase the dispersion of beliefs among market
participants, regardless of their direction.
The impact on market volatility is highest in the fewer circumstances
when the SNB was selling the domestic currency, the CHF. “Calming disor-
derly markets” and smoothing the fluctuations of the target exchange rate
are however among the priorities of most Central Banks, but also clearly the
tasks at which the SNB was the least successful. To support our assertions,
in the control sample represented by ex post uninformative customer trans-
actions, i.e., by trades that were not supposed to alter dealers and investors’
expectations about fundamentals and policy objectives of the Central Bank,
no statistically significant change in the proposed measures of market volatil-
ity is instead observed.
Cumulated returns in intervention days, free of weekday and yearly pat-
terns, are consistent with the direction of the corresponding oﬃcial interven-
tion by the SNB.12 The CHF was on average weaker in days when the Swiss
Central Bank was buying USD and stronger in days when dollars were sold.
Nonetheless, these excess returns are not significantly diﬀerent from zero at
any conventional level. Not surprisingly, the coeﬃcient bδ0 is negative and
significant when h = C > 0, thus suggesting that the SNB was purchas-
ing dollars to replenish its reserves, or for what Pasquariello (2001b) calls
wealth-preservation motives, in days when the CHF was strong.
As pointed out by Dominguez (1999), Central Banks rarely oﬀer informa-
tion regarding the motivations for their oﬃcial interventions, specific goals,
and target levels that the domestic currency is supposed to achieve, or the
time-frame over which these goals should be met, and the SNB is no excep-
tion. Moreover, investors’ and traders’ perception of the objectives of those
actions may aﬀect their final eﬀectiveness, regardless of the Central Bank’s
eﬀorts. Thus, the task of evaluating the success of a monetary authority’s
12To emphasize again the relevance of weekday cycles of activity and long-term trends
in the CHFUSD market, most day-of-the-week and year dummy coeﬃcients in both Eqs.
(2) and (3) for each of the variables under examination were strongly significant, and the
corresponding adjusted R2 were large. Hence, these eﬀects appear to capture a meaningful
portion of the variation experienced by each of the variables we consider in this study.
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attempt at managing the fluctuations of one or more exchange rates is daunt-
ing. Nonetheless, the results of Table 4 indicate that the SNB in the past
decade was unable to induce same-day directional moves to the Swiss Franc
or to reduce excessive market volatility. On the contrary, as shown in Table
4, no discernible appreciation or depreciation of the CHFUSD was registered
by our estimates of Eq. (2), nor did the volatility decrease in days when
those oﬃcial interventions were observed. Nonetheless, these actions had a
clear impact on market liquidity and transaction costs. In fact, the mean ab-
solute spread increased by 0.167 basis points when the SNB was selling USD
to buy CHF and declined by 0.254 basis points when the SNB was engaged
in sales of CHF. This last value is however not statistically significant, given
the relative scarcity of such events in our sample.
Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000), using a model of oﬃcial intervention,
market-making, and information asymmetry, argue that unexpected Central
Bank transactions, because hidden among the larger population of unin-
formed trades, induce dealers to increase their spreads. However, a change
in the bid-ask spread in days when oﬃcial SNB interventions were recorded
does not easily reconcile with this explanation, for CHFUSD dealers know
when the SNB hits their quotes, and the nature of its action is revealed to
them immediately afterwards and quickly divulged to the rest of the market.
More generally, Dominguez (1999) observes that, although oﬃcial interven-
tions, as any other foreign exchange transactions, are oﬃcially anonymous,
most Central Banks have developed relationships with dealers that allow
them to know their identity as a counterparty. In the spirit of Evans and
Lyons (2001), it is instead more likely that Central Bank intervention creates
(order flow) information asymmetry between the few dealers who are hit by
the oﬃcial intervention and learn about its direction and magnitude, and the
rest of the dealers who only slowly acquire this information from rumors and
their own order flow. The latter would be the dealers posting wider bid-ask
spreads, in order to be compensated for the losses that they expect to suﬀer
from trading with the former category of better informed dealers. In support
of this analysis is the fact that, when the (more numerous) uninformative
customer transactions are taken into account and Eq. (2) is estimated, the
changes in spread are not statistically significant from zero. Apparently, in
those circumstances the market does not seem to attribute any value to order
flow information resulting from transacting those trades.
As suggested by Pasquariello (2001b), it is also possible that intervention
trades alter market liquidity by pushing risk-neutral dealers’ inventories away
from desired levels. At the market’s relative demand elasticity in place at or
around the time when oﬃcial interventions were occurring, market-makers
might have been able to absorb those additional amounts, and to induce
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the necessary rebalancing in the investors’ portfolios just by altering their
spreads. Another plausible explanation for the findings presented in Table 4
is in forex dealers being risk-averse. Oﬃcial interventions increase exchange
rate volatility, and dealers would react to it by widening their spreads (e.g.,
Stoll (1978)). Along these lines, because customer transactions do not appear
to have any significant impact on the market’s dispersion of beliefs, bid-ask
spreads should not (and do not) vary. More work to clarify the nature of
this eﬀect is clearly warranted. In the next section we devise and estimate a
simple model that allows us to assess the relative importance of each of these
somewhat conflicting interpretations of our results.
Thus, absolute spreads tend to be higher in days when dollar sales on
behalf of the Swiss Central Bank were executed, and lower in days when
the SNB was instead selling CHF. Are those changes in the spread economi-
cally significant as well? We compute the average annualized impact of SNB
interventions on transaction costs for diﬀerent estimates of daily CHFUSD
turnover around its mean for 1998. Because we are unable to discern how
much of that turnover is due to sales or purchases of USD, we divide each of
those amounts in half (as in Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000)) and multiply
them by the average increase in the spread for each million of USD bought
or sold, i.e., by bδ0 from Table 4. These values are then multiplied by 252
(trading days) to provide annualized estimates.
We report the results of such computations in Table 5. For daily turnover
from $50 to $200 billion and in the more recurrent scenario of oﬃcial USD
sales/CHF purchases on behalf of the SNB, the average increase in transac-
tion costs borne by the community of forex investors ranges from over $100
to almost $420 million. These cost estimates are not negligible, especially in
a highly eﬃcient market like the one for the CHFUSD spot exchange rate.
Moreover, these values clearly ignore the potential anticipation and persis-
tence of such eﬀects for days before and after the intervention (an issue we
will soon address), the economic loss stemming from the increase in exchange
rate volatility for risk-averse investors, the reduction in market liquidity mea-
sured by the fewer posted quotes on the Reuters terminals, and the cost of
dealers’ and speculators’ portfolio rebalancing eﬀorts induced by oﬃcial in-
terventions. Transaction costs instead decline by $160 to $640 million when
the SNB is engaged in USD purchases/CHF sales. Assuming that the mar-
ket’s order flows are relatively insensitive to a change in spread of about a
quarter of one basis point, these amounts represent a net loss for the dealers,
hence a net gain for the population of investors.
The average frequency with which bid and ask prices are posted on the
Reuters terminals, dt, uniformly and significantly decreases by half a minute,
while the average number of quotes posted in a day significantly increases,
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although only by about 100 units, in days when oﬃcial interventions are
executed, even after controlling for the increase in the daily number of quotes
registered on the FXFX page between 1990 and 1998. This evidence suggests
that the arrival of new quotes clusters in shorter intervals of the day when the
SNB is trading, and is consistent with SNB actions inducing more dispersion
of beliefs among market participants. Indeed, in those circumstances, the
market would be more (and not less) uncertain about the true value of the
currency, portfolio rebalancing activity would intensify, and the dealers would
refresh their quotes more often until an implicit consensus is reached over
where the exchange rate should be. That information asymmetry and risk-
aversion, but not inventory considerations are more likely explanations for
these eﬀects is reinforced by the fact that customer transactions have no
statistically significant impact on dt and ft, although those trades are similar
in average daily magnitude to oﬃcial interventions (according to Table 2).
3.2 Cumulated impact of SNB actions
We now investigate the questions of whether the market anticipates the ar-
rival of oﬃcial interventions, hence inducing currency fluctuations, higher-
than-usual exchange rate volatility, lower market liquidity, and bigger trans-
action costs prior to when SNB-originated trades are executed, and of whether
such eﬀects persist afterwards. We do so by estimating Eq. (3) for the three
basic sets of oﬃcial interventions, h = I, I > 0, and I < 0, for I&C, and
for the three control categories made of customer transactions, C, C > 0,
and C < 0. Evidence from the set of events in I&C should reinforce the
results from the analysis of the event type h = I > 0, for all the oﬃcial
transactions there recorded were dollar purchases as well. We consider leads
and lags of K = 8 trading days with respect to the event day t.13 From the
estimated coeﬃcients we then compute measures of cumulated impact bξh−w
for each variable and for each event type h, and plot them in Figure 4.
Overall, our evidence suggests that SNB interventions have an asym-
metric impact on all the variables of interest, with oﬃcial dollar purchases,
recorded in the subsets h = I > 0 and h = I&C, being the events inducing
the biggest reaction in returns, in measures of exchange rate volatility and
trading intensity, and in transaction costs. Oﬃcial CHF sales by the SNB are
not only the least frequent events in our sample but also the ones most likely
13We chose K = 8 because each of the two ensuing symmetric intervals including the
event day is going to cover a temporal window of approximately two weeks, if we account
for potential weekday holidays. We also estimated Eq. (3) for larger and shorter numbers
of leads and lags, but our results were not meaningfully aﬀected.
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to generate greater dispersion of beliefs among market participants. In these
cases in fact the SNB was attempting to weaken its target exchange rate
against a historically strong currency (over the sample period) like the USD.
Hence, it should probably not be surprising that those are the circumstances
in which the market adjusts most abruptly to their occurrence.
Figure 4a, displaying the cumulated impact of both interventions and
customer transactions on daily aggregate midquote returns rt, sheds some
light on the mechanics and eﬀectiveness of SNB interventions. We start from
the left panel of Figure 4a, where h = I, I > 0, I < 0, and I&C. Between
1986 and 1996, the Swiss Central Bank purchased USD (CHF) in reaction to
a steadfast average appreciation (depreciation) of about 1% in the domestic
currency. On average, the market did not anticipate the incoming interven-
tions before the SNB-originated transaction was actually executed. Indeed,
cumulated impact coeﬃcients bξh−w for h = I on daily returns rt move in the
direction of the intervention only starting with bδ0. Nonetheless, indepen-
dently from their sign, SNB interventions produced relevant and persistent
eﬀects on the CHFUSD. In other terms, the market’s reaction to such actions,
measured by the estimated sums bξh−w for w < 0 and h = I, or h = I ≷ 0,
was prolonged over time; more specifically, the Swiss Franc weakened after
a purchase of USD or strengthened after a sale of USD for up to five days
following the oﬃcial intervention. Thus, the SNB was relatively successful in
slowing or reversing a previously observed trend in that key currency rate,
even though its transactions were generally smaller than typical forex trades.
This evidence also suggests that any new information resulting from those
interventions does not immediately disseminate to all market participants,
as in Peiers (1997) for the Deutschemark/USD exchange rate. That informa-
tion should play an important role in explaining these findings, in particular
that the signaling channel of intervention eﬀectiveness of Mussa (1981) and
Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) should be invoked is confirmed by the ev-
idence oﬀered by ex post uninformative customer transactions, in the right
panel of Figure 4a. The cumulative impact of those trades on midquote re-
turns is economically negligible, although their average intraday and daily
signed magnitudes are similar to the corresponding intervention amounts. If
imperfect asset substitutability at the market or dealer level was relevant
to the eﬀectiveness of Central Banks’ attempts to manage the fluctuations
of their domestic currencies, as argued by Evans and Lyons (2001), even ex
post uninformative actions by the SNB should aﬀect dealers’ inventories, in-
terdealer order flow, and eventually exchange rate returns, through market
participants’ eﬀorts at rebalancing their portfolios. However, by looking at
the small values estimated for bξh−w at or around the time when these trans-
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actions were recorded, there is no evidence of such an eﬀect. Cumulated
returns actually decrease before a customer purchase of dollars, but increase
soon afterwards; vice versa, bξh−w increases before customer sales of dollars
and declines significantly few days after their execution. Rather, the SNB,
by selling the domestic currency when strong and buying it when weak,
showed excellent market-timing ability in trading aimed at preserving its
wealth and/or at replenishing its reserves.
In the left panels of Figures 4b and 4c, exchange rate volatility, mea-
sured by both |rt| and r2t , appears to pick up as soon as the market learns
of an incoming intervention, or as soon as dealers and investors raise their
subjective probabilities of observing the SNB in action in the immediate fu-
ture.14 Uncertainty surrounding scopes, time horizon, and motives of those
interventions justifies increased market uncertainty and more reluctancy to
advertise new quotes up to three days before their occurrence. However, in
the days immediately preceding the event date, clearer anticipation of future
SNB activity appears to induce dealers to update their posted quotes more
(and not less) frequently, as indicated by the sharp and persistent decline in
cumulated bξh−w for dt (in the left panel of Figure 4f), and/or to market their
availability to trade more aggressively by posting more quotes, as shown by
the increase in ft in the left panel of Figure 4g.
Nonetheless, the arrival of SNB-originated trades does very little to reduce
the dispersion of beliefs among market participants, for the ex post realized
return volatility actually increases sharply and stays high for many days
following the event date. This is true especially for oﬃcial dollar purchases
(I > 0), i.e., for the interventions that we expect to be the most likely to
puzzle dealers and investors. No impact on |rt|, r2t , dt and ft is induced by
uninformative customer transactions, as shown in the right panels of Figures
4b, 4c, 4f and 4g, oﬀering further support to information asymmetry (among
market participants) and risk-aversion considerations, but not to inventory-
based models in explaining dealers’ behavior in the forex market in proximity
of Central Bank interventions.
Not only do dealers revise indicative bid and ask prices on the FXFX
page more often, but they also widen their posted absolute and proportional
spreads almost simultaneously with the increase in the exchange rate volatil-
14The dynamics of bξh−w for |rt| and r2t cannot be explained by a positive or negative
drift potentially induced by the intervention to the underlying exchange rate process. In
fact, when we estimate Eq. (3) for a more traditional measure of dispersion of tick-by-tick
CHFUSD returns from their daily intraday mean, the standard deviation of rtn over day
t, the resulting dynamics of the cumulated impact of intervention (not reported here) are
similar to the ones displayed by absolute and square returns in Figures 4b and 4c.
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ity, up to a cumulated amount of almost 1 basis point in the case of I > 0.
Spreads do not appear to return to previous levels even 8 days after the SNB
trades have been executed. Hence, Figures 4d and 4e suggest that the eﬀec-
tiveness of SNB interventions is accompanied not only by greater exchange
rate volatility but also by higher transaction costs, i.e., by costs borne by the
population of risk-averse investors for a relatively long period of time. Using
daily currency data, GARCH specifications, and implied volatility data from
American call options, Dominguez (1998) also shows that G-3 intervention
policies between 1977 and 1994 generally increased exchange rate volatility,
particularly if secret. Secrecy, however, cannot be invoked to explain our
findings, as all SNB operations in our sample became public knowledge in
the market immediately after their execution. Instead, the long-lasting surge
in volatility and spreads following those transactions could be the result of
protracted uncertainty over sign, size, and timing of future interventions
and, more generally, of the evolution of (possibly heterogeneous) expecta-
tions about future SNB activity in the CHFUSD market. Indeed, such slow
resolution of uncertainty and disagreement surrounding the scope of past and
incoming interventions might also explain the post-event drift in returns ob-
served in Figure 4a. We explore in greater detail the significance of potential
misinformation stemming from the actions of the SNB in the next section.
The model of Guembel and Sussman (2001) oﬀers an alternative, intrigu-
ing interpretation of Figure 4. Although most commentators and central
bankers seem to agree that active currency management policies should de-
crease forex volatility and deter speculation, Guembel and Sussman show
that these objectives may instead be mutually incompatible. This would be
the case when the domestic monetary authority can curb speculators’ profits
only at the cost of increasing the currency’s responsiveness to order flow,
hence inducing higher variation in intraday exchange rate returns. Along
these lines, it might be argued that the relative eﬀectiveness of SNB trades
in interrupting and/or reverting recent excess cumulated CHFUSD depre-
ciation/appreciation (evident from Figure 4a), the excess return volatility,
and the sharp increase in transaction costs in the days surrounding those
transactions (in Figures 4b, 4c, and 4d) all arise from the optimal resolution
of a trade-oﬀ between reducing speculation (or making it less profitable) and
smoothing fluctuations of the domestic currency. Unfortunately, without ad-
ditional evidence on the intensity of speculative activity on the Swiss Franc in
proximity of SNB interventions, this claim cannot be further substantiated.
As previously anticipated, bid-ask spreads do not seem to react to signed
or unsigned customer transactions, regardless of their size. This also corrob-
orates our (at this stage still preliminary) assertion that inventory consider-
ations play only a secondary role in explaining the impact of SNB actions
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on the process of price formation in the CHFUSD market, in particular on
the dynamics of market liquidity and transaction costs. In the next section,
a simple model is developed and estimated to evaluate more accurately the
relative importance of information, risk-aversion, or liquidity-based interpre-
tations of the impact of Central Bank intervention on the bid-ask spread,
as a proxy for the gains/losses incurred by the population of investors and
dealers in proximity of SNB trades.
4 Liquidity shocks’ decomposition
In the previous section we have shown not only that the Swiss monetary au-
thority appears to have been generally successful in reversing existing market
trends for the domestic currency, albeit less so in smoothing its fluctuations
or in reducing its variability, but also that absolute and proportional spreads
for the CHFUSD may increase or decrease in a (statistically and economi-
cally) significant fashion in proximity of SNB interventions. In many cases
these changes preceded the actual intervention event and were protracted in
time. For example, in the right panels of Figures 4d and 4e both St and st
rise after oﬃcial USD purchases and remain high for many days following
those trades.
Changes in market liquidity and transaction costs were typically accom-
panied by greater realized exchange rate volatility and more frequent up-
dates of indicative quotes on the Reuters terminals, thus suggesting that
SNB-originated trades did spark, rather than placate, uncertainty among
forex speculators and dealers. We have also seen that, in the control sample
made of ex post uninformative customer transactions, the cumulative impact
of SNB actions on returns, spreads and proxies for exchange rate volatility
was in most cases negligible. This led us to suggest a more limited role
for inventory-based explanations of Central Bank eﬀectiveness in the forex
market at or around the time when oﬃcial interventions were executed.
Overall, this evidence seems to indicate that, independently from their ef-
fectiveness, attempts by the SNB to manage the fluctuations of the CHFUSD
do aﬀect significantly market liquidity, and that the resulting changes in
transaction costs are borne alternatively by dealers (when spreads are tighter)
or by the population of investors at large (when spreads are instead wider). It
is then of interest to determine the relative importance of increasing disper-
sion of beliefs among market participants, information asymmetry, inventory,
or risk-aversion considerations in explaining the impact of Central Bank in-
terventions on the forex market’s ability to accommodate trades and news
with the least impact on transaction costs.
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As mentioned in Section 3, from the economic and financial literature
three main basic explanations can be identified of why Central Bank inter-
vention on the spot exchange rate might significantly aﬀect observed bid-ask
spreads in the forex market. The first one relies on the role of information.
According to Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000), unexpected intervention is
a source of information asymmetry between dealers and the Central Bank,
thus of higher spreads. Additionally, Peiers (1997) observes that information
generated by the intervention dissipates very slowly. Hence, more general in-
formation asymmetries may arise between any agent that, as a consequence of
the intervention itself, has acquired an informational advantage with respect
to the rest of the market and the broader population of dealers, therefore
inducing the latter to widen their spreads. Grossman (1988) suggests that,
following the release of new stabilizing information, transaction costs should
decline. Alternatively, Stein (1987) emphasizes the destabilizing role of mis-
information stemming from increasing information heterogeneity. Copeland
and Friedman (1987) then show that bid-ask spreads are positively related to
the level of misinformation existing in a market. Thus, oﬃcial interventions
could also dampen (augment) the wedge between bid and oﬀer exchange rates
if they reduce (raise) the degree of information heterogeneity or misinforma-
tion prevailing at or around the time these transactions were executed.
Second, it is argued for example by Evans and Lyons (2001) that, be-
cause of the imperfect substitutability of otherwise identical interest-bearing
assets denominated in diﬀerent currencies, interventions may have a liquid-
ity eﬀect on the forex markets. In fact, depending on the existing demand
elasticity of investors and market-makers, forex dealers may have to increase
or decrease not only their posted quotes but also their spreads to clear the
market. Moreover, as a consequence of the intervention and/or of the ensuing
portfolio rebalancing eﬀorts by investors and speculators, dealers’ inventories
may be pushed away from certain desired levels related to their risk-aversion
and to given capital constraints. Therefore, forex market-makers might mod-
ify bid and ask prices asymmetrically in order to induce their inventories to
revert toward those optimal levels, along the lines of Stoll (1978), Amihud
and Mendelson (1980), and Pasquariello (2001b).
Finally, related to the role of information is the observation that oﬃcial
interventions may be suggestive of more general shifts in some of the fun-
damental characteristics of the exchange rate, thus often greatly aﬀecting
exchange rate volatility, hence the bid-ask spreads posted by risk-averse
dealers. We have already shown, for example in Figures 4b and 4c, that in
our sample SNB-originated trades frequently had a destabilizing eﬀect on ex
post measures of market variation. Payne and Vitale (2001) further find that
volatility may rise also when transactions executed on behalf of the Central
22
Bank increase the heterogeneity of beliefs among market participants.
4.1 The model
In the remainder of this section, we want to evaluate the relative importance
of these considerations in explaining the impact of Central Bank’s actions
in the spot exchange rate market on the absolute spread St as a measure of
market liquidity and transaction costs, i.e., in explaining observed changes
in the variable St, ∆St, at or around the time when interventions were exe-
cuted. In this analysis we ignore proportional spreads, for we deem shocks to
st less adequate proxies for changes in liquidity induced by oﬃcial interven-
tions. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4a, SNB interventions aﬀect significantly
CHFUSD cumulated returns, hence the midquote exchange rate representing
the implicit “denominator” in st. Such eventuality could bias any resulting
inference on transaction costs based on the dynamics of ∆st.
In order to identify the components of those changes due to information,
liquidity, or volatility, we use a simple model originally developed by Fe-
denia and Grammatikos (1992). We start by assuming that, after controlling
for weekday and long-term eﬀects, absolute spreads observed in proximity of
the intervention event i, Si, are a function of two main by-products of the
intervention itself, liquidity Li and information Ii, i.e., that
Si = Si (Li, Ii) . (4)
Hence, we can approximate the change in spread due to intervention-induced
liquidity or information shocks as
∆Si =
∂Si
∂Li
∆Li +
∂Si
∂Ii
∆Ii. (5)
We have mentioned above that information shocks resulting from oﬃcial
interventions might condition the dynamics of bid-ask spreads in two general
ways. First, the arrival of information may aﬀect the current exchange rate
volatility, ∆Vi, and in turn the spread. Second, Central Bank interventions
may induce a higher or lower degree of information heterogeneity, Hi. Using
experimental studies, Copeland and Friedman (1987) find that spreads tend
to increase when dealers are exposed to price uncertainty ensuing from higher
information heterogeneity among market participants. Therefore, we claim
that Ii = Ii (∆Vi, Hi). This clearly implies that
∆Ii =
∂Ii
∂∆Vi
∆ (∆Vi) +
∂Ii
∂Hi
∆Hi. (6)
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Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (5) a new expression for ∆Si then follows:
∆Si =
∂Si
∂Li
∆Li +
∂Si
∂∆Vi
∆ (∆Vi) +
∂Si
∂Hi
∆Hi. (7)
Eq. (7) decomposes observed changes in the spread around an intervention
event i into perturbations potentially related to the intervention itself, i.e.,
shocks in market liquidity factors, ∆Li, changes in exchange rate volatil-
ity, ∆ (∆Vi), and increased or decreased dispersion of beliefs among market
participants, ∆Hi.
To make this expression operational without developing a more formal
model for the functional forms Si () and Ii (), we need to specify measures for
the corresponding shock variables and to approximate the partial derivatives
in Eq. (7). Based on the analysis of the previous subsections, we define
∆Si in two ways, depending on whether we focus on the aggregate average
impact of the intervention event over a prespecified interval surrounding the
date when the i-th intervention occurred, ti, or on the sequential impact
of the same event over each of the days in the same time interval. In the
first case we compute Si as the average absolute spread over a window of
17 days surrounding the event date ti, i.e., over the interval [ti − 8, ti + 8],
as in Eq. (3). In order to measure the magnitude of the impact of oﬃcial
intervention while at the same time controlling for the presence of overlapping
intervention intervals in the sample, we define a benchmark absolute spread
S
B
i as the mean value for Si over the first 20 days preceding the third to last
day before the event window [ti − 8, ti + 8] that do not contain any other past
corresponding event window day. If we label such days with a ∗ symbol, then
we have that S
b
i =
−11∗P
j=−30∗
Si(j)
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, where Si (j) is the absolute spread observed
at time ti + j. Finally, our proxy for intervention-induced shocks on Si for
each event i is given by ∆Si = Si − Sbi .
The evidence from Figures 4a to 4g suggests that investors and dealers
may anticipate the occurrence of a transaction on behalf of the Central Bank
and immediately discount it in prices and quotes even before that transaction
has actually been executed, and that the eﬀects of the intervention may
persist for several days over the process of price formation in the currency
markets. Hence, in the second case we define our shock variable for absolute
spreads in proximity of the i-th intervention as ∆Si (j) = Si (j)−Sbi for each
day in the interval [ti − 8, ti + 8]. In Figure 5 we display averages for those
shock measures, ∆Si (j), computed for each of the corresponding leads and
lags j from the event date ti, i.e., ∀j ∈ [−8, 8], over subsamples of event
types h = I, I > 0, I < 0, C, and I&C. The dynamics of Figures 4d and
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5 are strikingly similar. Indeed, consistently with Figure 4d, shocks to the
absolute spread Si (j) (except around customer transactions) are positive,
large, and increasing a few days before the intervention actually occurred, in
particular when the SNB was purchasing dollars, but decline steadily soon
afterwards.
We now focus on the variables on the right side of Eq. (7). In the equi-
librium spread model of Cohen et al. (1981), spreads are inversely related
to liquidity, i.e., ∂Si/∂Li < 0, and the marginal reduction in transaction
costs from increased liquidity is decreasing, that is lim
Li−→∞
∂Si/∂Li = 0. As in
Fedenia and Grammatikos (1992), we assume that ∂Si/∂Li ≈ βi/Li, where
βi < 0, and that the spread observed before the intervention, our bench-
mark variable S
b
i , is a good proxy for the inverse of liquidity. This implies
that ∂Si/∂Li ≈ βiSi. Finally, we subsume the change in liquidity ∆Li in a
parameter so that the liquidity term in Eq. (7) becomes
∂Si
∂Li
∆Li ≈ βiSi∆Li = λ1iS
b
i . (8)
According to Stoll (1978) and, more recently, Saar (2000a, b), spreads
are positively related to changes in volatility, i.e., ∂Si/∂∆Vi > 0. In the
already mentioned study by Copeland and Friedman (1987), spreads also
seem to increase in correspondence with higher dispersion of beliefs among
market participants, that is ∂Si/∂Hi > 0. For simplicity, we assume that
the relationship between spread and volatility is roughly linear, i.e., that
∂Si/∂∆Vi ≈ ai+ bi∆Vi. Therefore, if we define ∆ (∆Vi) = ci∆Vi, the volatil-
ity part in Eq. (7) becomes
∂Si
∂∆Vi
∆ (∆Vi) = λ2i∆Vi + λ3i (∆Vi)
2 , (9)
where λ2i = aici and λ3i = bici. Finally, we assume that ∂Si/∂Hi = λ0i. Our
basic measurable cross-event expressions from the general setting of Eqs. (5)
to (7) for both ∆Si and ∆Si (j) are then given by
∆Si = λ0i + λ1iS
b
i + λ2i∆Vi + λ3i (∆Vi)
2 + εi (10)
and
∆Si (j) = λ0i + λ1iS
b
i + λ2i∆Vi (j) + λ3i (∆Vi (j))
2 + εi (j) , (11)
respectively, for j ∈ [−8, 8] and for all the selected Central Bank actions i.
Because we want the regressors to measure shocks in information, volatil-
ity, and liquidity induced by the intervention activity, the regressors ∆Vi
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and ∆Vi (j) are measured with respect to a benchmark V
b
i constructed over
the same interval of time preceding the event interval we specified for the
dependent variables. Hence, ∆Vi = V i − V bi and ∆Vi (j) = Vi (j)− V
b
i .
We also consider the possibility that two additional variables, a shock in
the number of posted quotes at or around the intervention day ∆fi = f i−f bi
(∆fi (j) = fi (j)− f bi), and a shock in the mean rate of arrival of new quotes
on the Reuters terminals ∆di = di − dbi (∆di (j) = di (j) − d
b
i), impact ∆Si
(∆Si (j)). Pasquariello (2001b) argues that the absolute impact of oﬃcial
interventions on bid-ask spreads is greater when forex dealers hold less market
power, because more of the profits and losses they experience from such
actions have to be passed onto the population of investors. Saar (2000a)
suggests that, when dealers compete among each other for the incoming
trade, bid-ask spreads should decline. Hence, if we interpret the number of
daily posted quotes fi during intervention periods as measuring the intensity
of competition in the forex market, then positive values for ∆fi should be
accompanied on average by a decline in absolute spreads.
Grossman and Miller (1988) introduce a new temporal dimension to the
concept of liquidity, by suggesting that the possibility of immediate execution
of a trade should be valuable to investors. Thus, a market is liquid if, when
an investor is willing to transact now rather than later, prices and spreads
he has to face have not been revised too unfavorably in response to his quest
for immediacy. Grossman and Miller’s model derives the intuitive result that
the greater the number of speculators not willing to postpone a transaction,
the greater the liquidity of a market. Cohen et al. (1981) relate the concept
of liquidity to the degree of market thinness, as measured by the inverse of
the order arrival rate. Along these lines, we argue that negative (positive)
spread changes induced by more (less) intense and frequent trading activity
in proximity of an intervention (measured by negative (positive) shocks in
the average time between consecutive posted quotes, ∆di ), after controlling
for the role of market uncertainty, inventory considerations, and information,
represent such an additional measure of (il)liquidity induced by an event like
a Central Bank-originated trade.15
We evaluate the relevance of these considerations by proposing the fol-
15It is however necessary to emphasize that the variables ft and dt may be biased
or inaccurate measures of trading intensity, as argued for example by Dacorogna et al.
(2001). Indeed, simultaneous or automatic price quotation by dealers, delays in refreshing
posted quotes during periods of high activity, and quotes’ heterogeneous representativeness
should suggest some caution in interpreting ft and dt as proxies for volume, competition,
or market share in the empirical analysis that follows.
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lowing extensions of Eqs.(10) and (11):
∆Si = λ0i + λ1iS
b
i + λ2i∆Vi + λ3i (∆Vi)
2 + λ4i∆fi + λ5i∆di + εi (12)
and
∆Si (j) = λ0i + λ1iS
b
i + λ2i∆Vi (j) + λ3i (∆Vi (j))
2 +
+λ4i∆fi (j) + λ5i∆di (j) + εi (j) , (13)
respectively.
Before commenting on the estimation of Eqs. (10) to (13), in the following
list we provide a brief summary of the proposed interpretation and expected
sign for each of the coeﬃcients in the above regressions:
λ0i A proxy for the average change in transaction costs induced by a
change in the dispersion of beliefs among market participants. From
Copeland and Friedman (1987) we assume that ∂Si/∂Hi > 0; hence, a
positive (negative) estimate for this coeﬃcient indicates that on average
the degree of information heterogeneity, or what Stein (1987) calls
misinformation, is higher (lower) during the intervention interval, i.e.,
that oﬃcial interventions induce destabilizing (stabilizing) information.
λ1i A proxy for the average eﬀect of any shock induced by oﬃcial in-
terventions to market liquidity on the bid-ask spread. Under the
assumption that βi < 0, i.e., that spreads are inversely related to liq-
uidity, then if the estimated coeﬃcient is negative, interventions induce
on average greater market liquidity and tighter spreads.
λ2i A measure of the relationship between changes in ex post market
volatility accompanying transactions executed on behalf of the Central
Bank and the bid-ask spread. As in Stoll (1978) and Saar (2000a, b),
among others, we expect this relation to be positive, i.e., we expect a
positive value for λ2i.
λ3i A measure of the degree of non-linearity of the relation between
spread changes and exchange rate volatility. We do not formulate any
ex ante prediction on this coeﬃcient.
λ4i A measure of the impact on the bid-ask spread of more or less nu-
merous quotes posted on average in the FXFX page during intervention
intervals. If we interpret ∆fi > 0 (∆fi < 0) as a proxy for increasing
(decreasing) intensity of competition in the forex market, then posi-
tive values for ∆fi should be accompanied on average by a decrease in
the absolute spread. Therefore, λ4i should be negative and significant.
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λ5i A measure of the relation between investors’ need for immediacy
(and dealers’ ability to provide it) and the bid-ask spread. If we inter-
pret ∆di, the change in the rate at which quotes arrive to the Reuters
screens during intervention periods, as a proxy for a shock to such im-
mediacy induced by the occurrence of a SNB-originated trade, or as
a proxy for a shock to market thinness, a positive and significant co-
eﬃcient λ5i represents a positive value of immediacy during the event
period, i.e., suggests a meaningful role for the concept of liquidity à la
Grossman and Miller (1988).
4.2 Model estimation and results
We estimate Eqs. (10) to (13), with a standard GMM procedure, for the sub-
samples made of events i (in chronological sequence) of type h = I, I > 0,
I < 0, and I&C. Then, in Tables 6a and 6b we collect the resulting cross-
event parameters bλ0i to bλ5i when shocks to exchange rate volatility ∆Vi and
∆Vi (j) are approximated by the corresponding shocks to daily absolute re-
turns |ri| and |ri (j)|, respectively, and establish their statistical significance
using Newey-West standard errors, because of evidence of residual autocor-
relation and heteroskedasticity.16 We also consider the control sample of ex
post uninformative customer transactions, i.e., the case in which h = C, in
the last rows of Tables 6a and 6b. This allows us to gauge the importance
of oﬃcial interventions carrying information to the market, and to measure
the relative significance of the relationship between measured spread shocks
and changes in liquidity, information heterogeneity and volatility that those
interventions induce relative to trades executed simply to replenish reserves.
The model appears to perform very well in explaining aggregate and
single cross-event variation in positive and negative intervention shocks for
absolute spreads Si. We start with the analysis of the components of the
aggregate impact variables∆Si. AdjustedR2s are higher in the more frequent
circumstances when the SNB was buying CHF and selling USD, ranging
from as much as 72% for Eq. (10) to 84% for Eq. (12). The coeﬃcientbλ1i is significantly negative in all cases. This corroborates Evans and Lyons
(2001) in their claim that oﬃcial interventions aﬀect liquidity in the forex
market. In particular, our evidence suggests that on average SNB-originated
trades increased market liquidity and induced tighter spreads. The decline
in spreads bλ1i is however always larger when the Central Bank is engaged in
16The same parameters, estimated computing ∆Vi and ∆Vi (j) with changes in the
corresponding daily square return measures r2i and r
2
i (j), respectively, were very similar
to the ones in Tables 6a and 6b in both sign and significance. Therefore, they are not
reported here but are available on request.
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dollar sales, suggesting that this type of trade has a bigger impact on market
liquidity.
The coeﬃcient representing the eﬀect of volatility shocks on the absolute
spread, bλ2i, has the expected positive sign in Table 6a. Hence, the increase
in exchange rate volatility we observe in Figures 4b and 4c at or around
the time when SNB interventions are recorded appears to induce dealers to
widen their spreads. Interestingly, estimated values for bλ2i are highest when
our previous measures of excess volatility are the lowest, that is, when the
Swiss monetary authority was buying CHF. This suggests that the marginal
eﬀect on spread changes of volatility shocks is decreasing in their magnitude.
That shocks in ex post measures of return variation have a non-linear impact
on transaction costs is confirmed by the parameter bλ3i being statistically
diﬀerent from zero (and negative) in many of the subsamples considered in
the analysis.
Table 6a shows that, after controlling for changes in liquidity and volatil-
ity, absolute spreads increase in proximity of SNB interventions, i.e., bλ0is are
positive, significant, and strikingly similar across most event types. Hence,
transactions executed on behalf of the Swiss Central Bank had a destabi-
lizing eﬀect on the CHFUSD market, that is unrelated to the increase in
volatility that typically accompanied these events. Although, as previously
mentioned, it is possible that volatility shocks may be linked to information
heterogeneity as well, the consistently positive intercepts in the estimation of
Eqs. (10) and (12) suggest that currency management attempts by the SNB
did induce misinformation among market participants at or around the time
SNB-originated trades were recorded. Not surprisingly, the most eﬀective
interventions (according to Figure 4a), oﬃcial USD purchases (I > 0 and
I&C), are also the ones inducing the least amount of misinformation in the
CHFUSD market, i.e., the ones for which bλ0i is small and not statistically
diﬀerent from zero in Table 6a.
Sign and significance of bλ0i to bλ3i are unchanged, but their absolute mag-
nitude is generally reduced after accounting for shocks in the number of new
quotes appearing in the Reuters terminals during the event interval (∆fi)
and in the average time elapsing between new quotes posted on the FXFX
page (∆di). Estimates of bλ4i for the former are generally negative, but sta-
tistically diﬀerent from zero only for h = I&C, while estimates of bλ5i for
the latter are uniformly positive and significant at any confidence level. Evi-
dence of bλ4i < 0 is weakly supportive of changes in transaction costs induced
by changes in competition among dealers, measured by shocks to fi, during
the event period [ti − 8, ti + 8]. It in fact suggests that bid-ask spreads tend
to tighten if, as it appears to be the case from Figure 4g, at or around the
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time when oﬃcial interventions occur, more dealers appear to compete more
intensely for the incoming trade by posting more quotes, independently from
the direction of the SNB transaction, consistently with the findings of Saar
(2000a) and Pasquariello (2001b).
Positive bλ5is seem instead to indicate that immediacy was valued posi-
tively during the intervention event intervals. We have seen in Figure 4f that
the intensity of trading activity first increases and then declines in proximity
of SNB interventions. Indeed, dealers’ quotes are in fact posted at a slower
and slower pace in the days immediately preceding the intervention, but dt
remains high for many days afterwards only when the SNB sold CHF. If we
accept the interpretation of di as a proxy for availability of immediacy in the
market, or simply for market thinness, then we can argue that during in-
tervention periods the ability to trade promptly appeared to be significantly
aﬀected, and that these changes were reflected first in higher and then in
lower transaction costs borne by the population of investors at large.
When the single shock variable ∆Si (j) is considered, and Eq. (11) is
estimated in Table 6b, bλ0i is still positive and bigger in magnitude in the
subsample of SNB-originated sales of USD, suggesting that heterogeneity
of beliefs arises and persists during the entire interval surrounding oﬃcial
interventions. Unfortunately, in many cases the corresponding parameters
for liquidity and volatility, bλ1i and bλ2i, are not significant and do not display
the expected sign. Nonetheless, the performance of the model is clearly
improved, and in particular bλ1i and bλ2i become significant and have the
expected sign, by the inclusion of the two additional proxies for liquidity
shocks, ∆fi (∆fi (j)) and ∆di (∆di (j)), i.e., by the estimation of Eq. (13).
This is occurring because the cross-event series of shocks in Eqs. (11) and
(13), made of each of the days in the interval surrounding the intervention
event date ti (i.e., in [ti − 8, ti + 8]) are characterized by more noise than
the corresponding mean series ∆Si. Hence, adding shocks in the average
duration between consecutively posted quotes and in the daily number of
quotes’ arrivals appears to control for fluctuations in ∆Si (j) = Si (j) −
S
b
i that did not appear in the aggregate measure ∆Si = Si − Sbi , which
we use as a dependent variable in Eqs. (10) and (12). The coeﬃcientsbλ0i to bλ5i of Eq. (13) in Table 6b, from the decomposition of the shock
variable ∆Si (j) over each of the event interval days j, are consistent in
sign, magnitude, and significance with the parameters of Eq. (12) obtained
from the analysis of average changes ∆Si in Table 6a. For example, the
parameter bλ4i is now negative and significant for each of the events h under
investigation. This confirms the robustness of those estimates (and of the
ensuing interpretations) to the degree of finesse by which variables’ shocks
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in proximity of interventions are examined.
Overall, the results reported in Tables 6a and 6b emphasize the role played
not only by changes in market liquidity but also by information shocks in-
duced by the intervention, whether increasing the heterogeneity of beliefs
among investors and dealers or raising exchange rate volatility, in explaining
the increase in transaction costs that accompanies most Central Bank ac-
tions. The estimation of Eqs. (10) to (13) for the subsample made of inter-
vals during which the SNB executed customer transactions oﬀers additional
support for this claim. Customer transactions are ex post uninformative,
thus it should not be surprising that the coeﬃcients for volatility shocks,bλ2i and bλ3i, and misinformation, bλ0i, are either insignificant or much smaller
than their intervention counterparties.17 Estimates for bλ1i, bλ4i, and bλ5i are
instead significant and of the expected sign, suggesting that those trades,
of average size similar to that of most interventions, have some impact on
market liquidity, and in the direction proposed by the theory.
5 Size, trend, and expectations
In the analysis of the previous sections, we have classified SNB interventions
and customer transactions merely according to their sign. Whether an oﬃ-
cial intervention is to buy or sell the domestic currency is however not the
only distinguishing characteristic on which the economic and financial liter-
ature has focused its attention. In particular, three main features of such
transactions have been explored by both theoretical and empirical studies on
Central Banks’ attempts at managing exchange rates.
The first of these features is size. There seems to be widespread agree-
ment among researchers and practitioners, although with scant evidence,
that size should be relevant in explaining diﬀerential eﬀects of interventions
on currency returns, return volatility, and market liquidity. In the context
of a trading model à la Lyons (1997), a large order from the domestic mone-
tary authority is just another hot potato to be passed from one dealer to the
other in the forex market, as in Evans and Lyons (2001). Along those lines,
Pasquariello (2001b) shows that the eﬀect of currency management policies
on quotes and absolute and proportional spreads depends crucially not only
17Nonetheless, bλ0i may still be positive when h = C because the corresponding transac-
tions, although ex-post uninformative, are potentially informative ex-ante. In fact, as we
already mentioned, dealers do not know the nature of the trade they just concluded with
the monetary authority counterpart until after the transaction has been executed. The es-
timate for bλ0i would then be capturing this form of ex-ante uncertainty, or misinformation
among market makers.
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on the sign but also on the magnitude of Central Bank-originated trades
when competing risk-neutral dealers attempt to avoid an expected drift in
their inventories. From a diﬀerent perspective, Bhattacharya and Weller
(1997) and Vitale (1999) observe that large interventions, because generally
more expensive than small ones, should be expected to have a bigger sig-
naling impact on the domestic exchange rate. Payne and Vitale (2001) find
some empirical support for a positive relationship between the magnitude
of oﬃcial SNB transactions and intraday CHFUSD returns, when those are
computed over consecutive fifteen-minute intervals.
The second feature is market momentum. Studies by Dominguez and
Frankel (1993) and Lewis (1995) reveal that most recorded oﬃcial interven-
tions appear to be aimed at preventing a key exchange rate frommoving away
from some target level.18 Dominguez (1999) and Payne and Vitale (2001) em-
phasize that calming otherwise disorderly markets is also a likely priority for
a Central Bank. In practice, this implies that domestic monetary authorities
often trade currencies in order to resist or reverse an existing trend in their
key exchange rates. Conventionally, interventions going in the direction of
the trend are known as chasing the trend, while interventions challenging
the current trend are known as leaning against the wind. Many researchers
have found evidence for trend-resisting oﬃcial interventions.19 Both types of
oﬃcial transactions have the potential to increase or decrease the dispersion
of beliefs among market participants, depending on their expectations at or
around the time when the intervention was planned.
It is also reasonable to imagine that Central Bank-originated trades are
more likely to generate persistent eﬀects on the domestic currency when
reinforcing market sentiment, but that those eﬀects are going to be more
pronounced when information is revealed that alters investors’ view about the
exchange rate. It is then clearly of interest to establish if oﬃcial interventions
chasing or resisting a trend have a diﬀerent impact on the process of price
formation in the forex markets.
The third feature we focus on is market expectations. In the already
mentioned paper by Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000), it is only the unex-
18Lewis (1995), for example, notes that during the period 1985-1987 the Federal Reserve,
Bank of Japan, and the Bundesbank usually bought USD against Deutschemark and Yen
if the dollar was weaker than the Louvre meeting’s agreed level, and sold foreign currency
reserves when the dollar was appreciating “too much”.
19In several cases Central Banks were found buying dollars while the dollar was de-
preciating (Taylor (1982)), or buying dollars despite expectations of lower U.S. interest
rates, i.e., inconsistently with current or future fundamentals (Lewis (1995), Kaminsky
and Lewis (1996)). Edison (1993) reports strong empirical support for leaning against the
wind interventions, but only weaker evidence of chasing the trend interventions attempting
to correct misalignments in the foreign exchange market.
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pected component of Central Bank intervention to be related to the adverse
selection component of the bid-ask spread in the forex market. In Pasquar-
iello (2001b), uncertainty about the likelihood of arrival of orders from the
Central Bank and the nature of its future actions make it more diﬃcult for
dealers to clear the market, and induce them to revise their posted quotes.
According to these views, the expected component of oﬃcial interventions
should already be discounted in the exchange rate before those transactions
actually occur, hence should not aﬀect significantly prices and transaction
costs. Consequently, only unexpected interventions should potentially induce
the most sudden and radical revisions of market participants’ beliefs, hence
the biggest shocks in currency returns and volatility, in the existing degree
of misinformation among investors and dealers, and in bid-oﬀer spreads.
In this section we want to assess the relative significance of these consid-
erations in explaining the impact of Central Bank interventions on currency
returns, on the existing degree of information heterogeneity, on exchange rate
volatility, and on various measures of market liquidity and transaction costs.
We start by classifying SNB daily interventions based on whether they were
big or small, on whether they were in the direction of or against an existing
trend in the CHFUSD, or on whether the arrival of the Swiss Central Bank
and the nature of its actions were expected by the market. Then, we re-
estimate Eqs. (2) and (3) to evaluate any contemporaneous and cumulated
diﬀerence in the variables of interest in proximity of these new intervention
types. We will also look at whether the decomposition of measured bid-ask
spread shocks previously implemented in Section 4 is somehow altered by the
proposed new groupings, by re-estimating Eqs. (12) and (13) as well.
We say that an aggregate intervention transaction in day t, It, is small
(big) if its absolute magnitude is smaller than or equal to (greater than)
the median absolute intervention size computed over the entire sample, $50
million in our case. 57 of the 86 recorded oﬃcial SNB interventions are so
classified as small (Ismall) and 29 as big (Ibig). Many interventions are concen-
trated at the median size, hence Ismalls are more numerous than Ibigs. About
80% of the actions in each of the two groups are dollar sales. We then define
an intervention operation at day t as chasing the trend (leaning against
the wind) if its sign is equal to (the opposite of) the sign of the sum of cu-
mulated daily exchange rate returns over the previous two trading days, i.e.,
if sign (It) = (6=) sign (rt−1 + rt−2).20 As a result, 22 interventions (of which
20This procedure was originally suggested by Payne and Vitale (2001). In their paper,
interventions’ signs are actually compared to exchange rate returns over the 24 hours
preceding the event interval. Given the lower-frequency nature of our study, and to account
for the possibility that the intervention may have been anticipated by the market, we
decided to use a longer time-horizon, of two trading days before the intervention day.
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16 where CHF purchases) are classified as chasing the trend (Itrend), while 64
(of which 12 where CHF sales) were leaning against the wind (Iwind) accord-
ing to our criterion. This evidence of more frequent interventions against
an existing trend in the CHFUSD is consistent with previously mentioned
empirical evidence for G3 Central Banks.
Finally, we want to classify the available intervention events as expected
or unexpected by market participants at or around the time they occurred.
To do so we use a parsimonious method that, without specifying a full-fledged
structural model for how investors form their expectations about the actions
of the monetary authority, allows us to use the information contained in the
observed prices at which those oﬃcial transactions were executed. In these
prices in fact should those expectations have been discounted in an eﬃcient
market such as the forex market is usually deemed to be.
Hence, an intervention should be expected if it is transacted at a price
that already incorporates all or most of the relevant information related to
that action, i.e., at a price that is not “too distant” from the average price
at which trades on the same side of the market could have been executed in
proximity of when that Central Bank order arrived. Because the SNB reveals
the nature of its trade (intervention versus customer transaction) only after
the completion of the trade itself, we look at prices posted not only before
but also following the event time. We do in fact need to evaluate the degree
of market surprise not only regarding the timing of the transaction, its sign,
and magnitude but also regarding the revelation about its nature by the
Swiss monetary authority soon after it has been cleared.
To implement this model-free criterion, we first divide each trading day in
our joint database of tick-by-tick validated quotes and intraday SNB trans-
actions into a succession of five-minute segments stretching from 5 a.m. to
9 p.m. GMT. Then, we classify each day t intervention as unexpected
(expected) if the price at which the first intervention trade of day t is ex-
ecuted, SCBt , is (not) statistically diﬀerent from the mean ask quote (for a
dollar purchase by the SNB) or from the mean bid quote (for a dollar sale
by the SNB) posted over a 35-minute interval [tn,y−3, tn,y+3] made of the
five-minute period y that includes the recorded time of the transaction tn,y,
and of the three five-minute periods before and after the y-th period. We
focus on the first intervention of the day because, according to Fischer and
Zurlinden (1999), this is the only transaction leading to a significant move
on the CHFUSD exchange rate, since the information acquired by one dealer
about that first oﬃcial trade by the SNB tends to spread swiftly to other
market-makers (and into their posted quotes) and eventually to the market
at large.
More specifically, if for example the first oﬃcial dollar purchase of day t
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occurs at time tn,y, corresponding to the y-th five-minute interval of the day,
the corresponding expectation indicator Et is computed as a T -statistic,
Et =
SCBtn,j − µAtn,y−3,tn,y+3
σAtn,y−3,tn,y+3√
Ntn,y−3,tn,y+3
, (14)
where µAtn,y−3,tn,y+3 is the mean indicative ask price over the above-mentioned
35-minute interval surrounding the event time, σAtn,y−3,tn,y+3 is the corre-
sponding standard deviation, andNtn,y−3,tn,y+3 is the number of filtered posted
quotes in [tn,y−3, tn,y+3]. It is then going to be classified as unexpected
(expected), Iun exp (Iexp), if the probability of the absolute value of a t-
distributed statistic being as big or bigger than |Et| by chance is smaller
than or equal to (bigger than) 1%. When we implement this procedure for
each of the 86 interventions in the sample, we find that only 13 of them were
actually expected, at least according to Eq. (14).21 Eq. (14) allows us to
evaluate the relevance of expectations about SNB actions in measuring their
eﬀects on market conditions without integrating a more complex modelling
choice in the hypotheses we test throughout our statistical investigations.
5.1 New action types: marginal and cumulated eﬀects
We start by estimating Eq. (2) to measure the impact of interventions of
type h = Ismall, Ibig, Itrend, Iwind, Iexp, and Iun exp on each of contemporaneous
variables of interest, bδ0, after controlling for weekday seasonalities and long-
term trends, in Table 7, and cumulated impact coeﬃcients bξh−w on the subset
of them which displayed the most interesting dynamics in Figure 4, rt, r2t , St,
and dt in Figure 6a to 6d, respectively. Again, in the special case in which
Xt = rt, we substitute the regressor It (j, h) with the signed event dummy
I∗t (j, h). The resulting adjusted R
2s are very similar across diﬀerent action
types. Moreover, the concentration of transactions of the same sign in each
of the new groups is consistent with the original sample I, i.e., roughly 20%
of each (new and old) action type is made of CHF sales. Hence, a comparison
of the estimated parameters bδ0 and bξh−w across categories h is a reasonable
exercise.
Not surprisingly, interventions that are big in magnitude, leaning against
the wind, or expected by the market induce the biggest marginal and ag-
21In particular, 3 of these 13 expected oﬃcial interventions were USD purchases, while 58
of the remaining 73 unexpected SNB transactions were USD sales. These numbers either
did not change or changed only marginally by expanding or tightening the window used
to compute Et or by altering the selected significance level.
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gregated impact on CHFUSD daily returns (of about 1% over 7 to 10 days
surrounding the event), as evident from Figure 6a. We mentioned already
the argument by Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) that bigger oﬃcial transac-
tions are usually more expensive for the monetary authority, thus represent
the most credible signals of policy intentions or fundamentals to the mar-
ket. Alternatively, according to Evans and Lyons (2001), large interventions
may aﬀect exchange rates because of imperfect asset substitutability at the
market and dealer level. In our sample, however, the SNB tends to split
evenly its intervention among traders for lots not larger than $10 million
each. Additionally, the mean number of intraday SNB transactions in dates
when the intervention was big (11.5) is higher that the mean number of in-
traday SNB transactions registered when h = Ismall (6.30). This suggests
that bigger interventions have more chances to be seen by more dealers,
thus that in such circumstances the information regarding the interventions
dissipates more fully, i.e., reaches more investors, hence making them more
eﬀective. Vice versa, along those lines, small and expected interventions are
the least eﬀective in moving cumulated exchange rate returns. The coeﬃ-
cient bδ0 for the absolute spread St in Table 7 is positive and significant only
when h = Ibig. Nonetheless, this fact is hardly supportive of any explana-
tion of bid-ask spread dynamics based on inventory in proximity of Central
Bank interventions, as we have so far argued, when we consider that the
SNB splits its large trades across several dealers. The above evidence may
instead suggest that big interventions induce more misinformation among
market participants, a possibility we explore in the analysis of spread shocks
that follows in Section 5.2.
Interventions chasing the trend face fewer market frictions and obstacles,
as they do not induce market participants to revise their beliefs about the
currency, but rather reinforce those beliefs. Consistently with this fact, they
also seem to only marginally aﬀect the exchange rate, to be almost com-
pletely reabsorbed by the end of the first day following the event date, and
to generate among the smallest shocks to volatility, as measured by both ab-
solute returns in Table 7 and square returns in Figure 6b. Interestingly, Itrend
events are also typically anticipated by the market by at least two days before
their occurrence, suggesting that uninformed dealers and investors are able
to recognize levels of the currency around which trend-chasing interventions
by the SNB become more likely. The impact of oﬃcial SNB actions lean-
ing against the wind, i.e., against current market sentiment, is instead very
persistent, and is accompanied by greater shocks to exchange rate volatility.
It is when expected SNB actions hit the market that the CHFUSD ex-
change rate experienced the greatest fluctuations, cumulated excess volatility
and duration were the highest, and dealers widened their spreads the most,
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contrary to the results of Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000), based on a struc-
tural model for the estimation of the anticipated component of Central Bank
trades. A possible interpretation for this evidence can be found by looking
at aggregated excess returns in the days preceding those events, in Figure
6a: extreme trends in the domestic currency appear to have led the market
to anticipate the arrival of SNB-originated trades. Those trends, and the
expected reaction by the Central Bank were also accompanied by greater
uncertainty among dealers, as proxied by increasing spreads (in Figure 6c).
In such circumstances, SNB interventions were only partially successful in
resisting the directional move of the CHFUSD, which in fact appeared to re-
verse to pre-intervention levels few days after those oﬃcial transactions were
executed, as shown by the dynamics of bξIexp−w for rt when w < 0 in Figure
6a. Expected SNB interventions also failed to eliminate or reduce market
volatility and transaction costs, for cumulated excess square returns (in Fig-
ure 6b) and spreads (in Figure 6c) actually increased following events of type
h = Iexp.
Both measures of liquidity shocks, St and dt, are very similar across clas-
sification criteria, with the exclusion of Iexp. For most of the event types, in
the days preceding the arrival of the Swiss monetary authority the intensity
by which dealers post quotes on the FXFX page rarefies, to then recover in
the days afterwards, consistently with what we had found for h = I. More
generally, the evidence from Figure 6 and Table 7 does not reveal any sig-
nificant diﬀerence in excess market liquidity, intensity of trading activity,
and transaction costs ensuing from SNB actions, when these diﬀerences are
based on most of the proposed event categories h, although our measures
of intervention eﬀectiveness and exchange rate volatility do vary, often sub-
stantially, depending on trade magnitude, market momentum, and dealers’
expectations.
5.2 New action types: spread shock decomposition
It remains to verify whether the relative importance of information, liquidity,
and volatility considerations in explaining observed shocks in transaction
costs changes across the new intervention types. To do so, we estimate Eq.
(12) and (13) for h = Ismall, Ibig, Itrend, Iwind, Iexp, and Iun exp in Table 8,
again using changes in |ri| and |ri (j)| to proxy for the shocks to exchange rate
volatility ∆Vi and ∆Vi (j), respectively. The resulting estimated coeﬃcientsbλ0i to bλ5i are in most cases statistically significant, and in all cases their signs
are as expected from the theory we presented in Section 4.
Big interventions, which Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) suggest being
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ex ante the most informative, and expected interventions, which should have
surprised investors and market-makers the least, appear nonetheless to have
induced the greatest amount of misinformation among market participants
(i.e., the greatest bλ0i), consistently with evidence presented in the previous
subsection. Aggregate changes in absolute spreads computed in proximity of
interventions chasing the trend, ex ante the least informative because they
are simply confirming existing investors’ beliefs rather than challenging them,
are instead independent from excess volatility induced by fundamental news.
The coeﬃcient bλ2i for h = Itrend is in fact not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
This is the case for expected interventions as well. This should again not
be surprising, given that the market had probably already discounted any
information content ensuing from those trades during the price formation
process preceding their actual execution. When the SNB attempted to lean
against the wind, the resulting degree of information heterogeneity bλ0i was
as low as for small (and less informative) oﬃcial transactions and for Iun exp,
suggesting that most investors and dealers agreed in the interpretation of the
news generated by these types of actions.
Shocks to competition among dealers in proximity of SNB actions were a
relevant factor in explaining the estimated ∆Si > 0 (i.e., bλ4i is negative) just
when interventions did not represent a surprise to investors or were above the
median absolute size. The loss (gain) of immediacy displayed in Figure 6d,
instead, always translated into greater (lower) spreads (bλ5i > 0) unless when
each day in the event interval [ti − 8, ti + 8] is considered. Overall, in de-
composing the observed changes in bid-ask spreads, the evidence we present
shows that SNB actions did aﬀect the degree of information heterogeneity
among market participants and the relation between volatility, competition,
market thinness, and spreads diﬀerently, depending on the nature of the
event type h or on the selected estimation window. Nonetheless, Table 8 also
shows that all SNB interventions, whether big or small, toward or against
market momentum, expected or unexpected, had a uniformly positive impact
on market liquidity (bλ1i < 0), which attenuated the increase in transaction
costs borne by the population of investors at and around the time when those
oﬃcial trades were executed.
6 Conclusions
Are interventions in the foreign exchange market a source of information
or just noise? Is there any cost borne by the population of investors stem-
ming from Central Bank’s attempts at managing the fluctuations of some
key exchange rates? And, if so, why? These were the issues we raised at the
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beginning of this study. At this stage, we believe we can provide a compre-
hensive answer to such questions.
Our analysis suggests that oﬃcial sterilized SNB interventions aﬀected
significantly diﬀerent measures of exchange rate behavior, ex post volatility,
market liquidity, and trading intensity both in the short and in the long-term.
From extensive use of event-study methodology on the resulting joint dataset
of indicative quotes and SNB transactions we find that oﬃcial interventions,
although representing only a small fraction of the average daily turnover in
the CHFUSD market, had meaningful and persistent (albeit asymmetric,
depending on their sign) eﬀects on currency returns, stretching for several
days after those transactions were executed, especially when big in size, lean-
ing against the wind, or expected by the market. Interestingly, the market
did not anticipate incoming interventions except when chasing the trend.
On average, oﬃcial dollar purchases followed a steady strengthening of the
CHF, while oﬃcial dollar sales frequently came as a reaction to a period of
protracted weakness of the domestic currency.
Nonetheless, the Swiss monetary authority was much less successful in
smoothing fluctuations of the currency or in reducing its variability. Ex post
measures of exchange rate volatility in fact always surged in proximity of
Central Bank interventions and stayed high for many days afterwards. Ab-
solute and proportional spreads for the CHFUSD also increased or decreased
in a (statistically and economically) significant fashion at or around the dates
when Central Bank interventions were conducted by the SNB. In many cases,
these eﬀects too preceded the actual intervention event and were protracted
in time. For example, we estimate that (annualized) transaction costs borne
by investors and speculators increase on average by $100 to over $400 million
in days when the SNB was selling USD/buying CHF, while instead decrease
on average by $150 to $640 million when the Swiss monetary authority was
engaged in USD purchases/CHF sales. Changes would be of even greater
magnitude if computed on a cumulated basis. Because many of these eﬀects
were found to be statistically negligible for customer transactions, we con-
clude that the potential information content of SNB interventions must have
played an important role in explaining their impact on the CHFUSD market.
Finally, decomposition of those spread shocks in proximity of SNB trades
into shocks related to misinformation, liquidity, fundamental volatility, com-
petition, and immediacy reveals that oﬃcial interventions (especially if big
in size or expected by the market) heightened heterogeneity of beliefs among
market participants, impacted significantly trading immediacy and ex post
exchange rate variation (unless if chasing the trend), and increased market
liquidity and competition among dealers for the incoming orders. Many of
these changes were costly, i.e., translated into higher transaction costs borne
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by the population of investors, even when the interventions were not eﬀective
in altering existing market momentum or, as it was very often the case, in
stabilizing disorderly market conditions.
This paper oﬀers many avenues for further research. For example, we
showed here that oﬃcial interventions have significant and long-lasting eﬀects
on bid-ask spreads and other daily measures of market liquidity. It may be
of interest to investigate those dynamics over finer levels of aggregation using
our database of intraday transactions by the Swiss monetary authority. In
this study we also strongly emphasize the failure by the SNB to smooth
existing currency fluctuations, which instead typically increase around the
time when oﬃcial interventions were recorded. Although the costs suﬀered
by risk-averse investors and dealers in rebalancing their portfolios in response
to enhanced market uncertainty are diﬃcult to estimate, they must probably
be relevant. Exploring the nature and direction of causality in the potential
relation between estimated excess volatility and the Central Bank’s attempts
to manage the domestic currency or to curb profits from speculation, and,
more generally, developing a clearer understanding of the process by which
(ex ante) expected and (ex post) realized exchange rate volatility change in
anticipation and in response to the actions of an active monetary authority
are tasks that certainly deserve more attention and eﬀorts.
We believe that our dataset oﬀers an unparalleled opportunity for finan-
cial economists to study in a comprehensive manner the process by which
dealers buy and sell foreign currency during a trading day when a non-profit
maximizing player like the Central Bank is attempting to condition the pro-
cess of price formation. We reserve these investigations for future work.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics on intraday SNB transactions on CHFUSD
This table reports descriptive statistics for signed and unsigned intraday interventions
(Iti) and customer transactions (Cti) executed by the SNB between April 17, 1986 and
December 23, 1998. Transaction amounts are in millions of U.S. Dollars. A positive
(negative) value for Iti or Cti represents a purchase (sale) of dollars. N is the number of
observations available in the sample for each item. d is the number of dealers involved in
the transaction for a given day. Skew is the coeﬃcient of skewness, while Kurt is the
excess kurtosis. The standard errors of these statistics in their corresponding asymptotic
normal distributions are computed as
¡
6
N
¢ 1
2 and
¡
24
N
¢ 1
2 , respectively. A * indicates that
the statistic is significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level or less. In the case of d,
a * indicates that the mean number of dealers involved in a SNB transaction over a given
day (µd) is statistically diﬀerent from 1 at the 10% significance level or less.
Type of SNB transaction
Iti Iti > 0 Iti < 0 Cti Cti > 0 Cti < 0
N 709 243 466 555 533 22
Mean -3.29 8.40 -9.39 16.26 17.30 -8.96
Median -5 10 -10 10 10 -10
Stdev 10.41 3.23 7.14 23.03 22.90 3.58
Min -100 5 -100 -18 0.7 -18
Max 35 35 -5 200 200 -1
Skew -1.40∗ 2.72∗ -6.35∗ 3.98∗ 4.13∗ 0.19
Kurt 11.45∗ 20.19∗ 63.05∗ 20.82∗ 21.54∗ 1.23
µd 6.95
∗ 7.15∗ 6.85∗ 1.70∗ 1.70∗ 1.83
σd 5.31 4.89 5.55 1.39 1.41 0.72
Min d 1 1 1 1 1 1
Max d 36 21 36 10 10 3
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics on daily SNB transactions on CHFUSD
This table reports descriptive statistics for aggregated daily interventions (It) and
customer transactions (Ct) executed by the SNB between April 17, 1986 and December
23, 1998. Transaction amounts are in millions of U.S. Dollars. A positive (negative) value
for It or Ct represents a purchase (sale) of dollars.
Type of SNB transaction
It It > 0 It < 0 Ct Ct > 0 Ct < 0
N 102 34 68 326 314 12
Mean -22.89 60 -64.34 27.68 29.36 -16.42
Median -25 50 -50 15 15 -20
Stdev 93.76 34.82 86.17 56.25 56.62 8.16
Monday
N 18 6 12 60 57 3
Mean -7.5 62.5 -42.5 37.24 39.84 -12
Median -22.5 55 -40 13.05 15 -5
Stdev 57.42 30.29 25.89 105.12 107.22 15.72
Tuesday
N 23 11 12 53 52 1
Mean 3.70 57.73 -45.83 32.20 33.20 -20
Median -20 50 -30 15 15 -20
Stdev 61.11 34.89 27.70 58.99 59.11 n.a.
Wednesday
N 18 6 12 67 65 2
Mean -41.94 62.5 -94.17 23.52 24.70 -15
Median -25 50 -32.5 15 15 -15
Stdev 144.22 30.62 150.98 28.80 28.40 7.07
Thursday
N 15 5 10 68 65 3
Mean -19.67 69 -64 24.80 26.89 -20.33
Median -50 55 -62.5 16 17 -20
Stdev 69.75 35.78 21.19 30.35 29.40 0.57
Friday
N 28 6 22 78 75 3
Mean -44.10 51.67 -70.22 23.32 24.92 -16.67
Median -27.5 35 -40 14 15 -20
Stdev 103.31 49.97 98.97 31.83 31.40 5.78
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics on CHFUSD grouped variables
This table reports summary statistics (defined in the notes to Table 1) for rt, |rt|,
r2t , St, st, dt, and ft computed over the interval January 2, 1986 - December 31, 1998.
rt is the cumulative daily return over day t. The cumulative daily absolute return, |rt|,
and square return, r2t , are proxies for daily exchange rate volatility. St is the average
bid-ask spread (in units of basis points) over day t, while st is the average logarithmic
bid-ask spread over day t. Finally, the duration variable dt is the average length of time
(in seconds) between consecutive quotes posted on the Reuters terminals over day t, while
the frequency variable ft is the number of posted quotes over day t. bρh is the first-order
estimated autocorrelation. LB (5) is the Ljung-Box test for up to the fifth-order serial
correlation. A * indicates that the statistic is not diﬀerent from zero at any conventional
significance level.
N Mean Stdev Skew Kurt bρ1 LB (5)
rt 3,352 -0.0079%
∗ 0.7338% -0.11 2.23 0.024∗ 14.85
|rt| 3,352 0.4216 0.2175 1.01 1.73 0.527 1,101
r2t 3,352 0.00020 0.00014 1.99 7.56 0.472 946.8
St 3,352 9.4391 1.2466 5.17 44.31 0.473 948
st 3,352 0.0659% 0.0077% 2.35 14.40 0.503 1,024
dt 3,352 56.66 275.40 20.78 485.26 0.084 28.02
ft 3,352 1873.1 868.9 0.90 0.88 0.541 1,158
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Table 4. Impact regression estimates
This table reports GMM estimates for the parameter δ0 in the regression
Xt = α+
2P
l=1
γlXt−l + δ0It (0, h) +
4P
i=1
ψiDt (i) +
1997P
k=1986
ϑkYt (k) + εt,
described in Section 3 (Eq.(2)), for each of the variables of interest Xt, from rt to ft,
defined in the notes to Table 3. bδ0 measures the impact of event h, for h = I , I ≷ 0,
C, C ≷ 0, or I&C, on X , after controlling for weekday seasonalities (with day-of-the-
week dummies Dt (i)) and long-term trends (with year dummies Yt (k)). It (0, h) is an
unsigned event dummy equal to 1 if the transaction of type h occurred in day t, and to
zero otherwise. T-statistics for bδ0 are computed using Newey-West standard errors. R2a is
the adjusted R2. A ˆ indicates that we replaced It (0, h) with the signed event dummy
I∗t (0, h) equal to 1 (-1) if a USD purchase (sale) of type h occurred in day t, and to
zero otherwise. A * indicates that the t-statistic is significant at the 10% level or less.
Estimates for the other coeﬃcients in Eq. (2) are available from the author on request.bδ0 for diﬀerent event types h
I I > 0 I < 0 C C > 0 C < 0 I&C
rt 0.089% 0.139% -0.074% -0.081% -0.097% -0.252% 0.058%
T-stat 0.86 0.54 -0.69 -1.93∗ -2.36∗ -1.07 0.19
R2a 0.66%ˆ 0.65% 0.65% 0.72%ˆ 0.76% 0.67% 0.63%ˆ
|rt| 0.0489 0.0934 0.0358 -0.0016 -0.0028 0.0246 0.0434
T-stat 5.20∗ 3.17∗ 4.51∗ -0.25 -0.44 0.87 2.16∗
R2a 73.13% 73.10% 73.06% 73.01% 73.01% 73.16% 73.03%
r2t 0.00005 0.00009 0.00003 3.5E-6 3.3E-6 8.5E-6 0.00006
T-stat 4.94∗ 2.96∗ 4.46∗ 0.64 0.58 0.47 2.44∗
R2a 64.92% 64.89% 64.78% 64.69% 64.69% 64.88% 64.77%
St 0.0726 -0.2545 0.1666 0.0462 0.0577 -0.2066 0.7860
T-stat 0.88 -1.01 2.36∗ 0.89 1.09 -2.45∗ 1.53
R2a 65.39% 65.40% 65.41% 65.39% 65.40% 65.39% 65.57%
st 6.4E-5% -0.002% 0.0005% 0.0007% 0.0008% -0.0008% 0.0073%
T-stat 0.10 -0.63 1.09 2.31∗ 2.46∗ -2.25∗ 1.78∗
R2a 64.47% 64.49% 64.48% 64.54% 64.55% 64.48% 64.89%
dt -30.68 -26.02 -31.90 -18.17 -17.45 -31.85 -48.55
T-stat -2.39∗ -2.36∗ -2.01∗ -2.32∗ -2.20∗ -1.63 -1.11
R2a 1.00% 0.98% 1.00% 1.01% 1.00% 0.98% 0.99%
ft 104.9 134.1 95.94 -19.21 -27.67 164.4 60.31
T-stat 3.04∗ 2.38∗ 2.33∗ -0.89 -1.26 1.93∗ 0.86
R2a 79.44% 79.42% 79.43% 79.41% 79.41% 79.42% 79.41%
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Table 5. The impact of SNB-originated trades on transaction costs
In this table we compute, as in Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000), the average annu-
alized increase or decrease in transaction costs (in millions of U.S. Dollars) induced by
SNB interventions for diﬀerent estimates of daily CHFUSD turnover (in millions of U.S.
Dollars). Because we do not know how much of that turnover is due to sales or purchases
of USD, each of those amounts is divided in half and multiplied by the estimated change in
the daily absolute spread St (in units of basis points) from Table 4, bδ0, when h = I > 0
and h = I < 0, for each million of USD bought or sold. The resulting values are then
multiplied by 252 (trading days) to provide annualized estimates. A * indicates that the
variable is significant at the 10% level or less.
Turnover bδ0 for I > 0 Annual Cost/Gain bδ0 for I < 0 Annual Cost/Gain
$50,000 -0.254 -$160.27 0.167∗ $104.96
$75,000 -0.254 -$240.41 0.167∗ $157.44
$100,000 -0.254 -$320.54 0.167∗ $209.92
$125,000 -0.254 -$400.68 0.167∗ $262.40
$150,000 -0.254 -$480.82 0.167∗ $314.87
$175,000 -0.254 -$560.95 0.167∗ $367.35
$200,000 -0.254 -$641.09 0.167∗ $419.83
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Table 6a. Event shock decomposition: aggregated spreads Si
This table reports GMM estimates for the parameters λ0i to λ5i in the regression
∆Si = λ0i + λ1iS
b
i + λ2i∆Vi + λ3i (∆Vi)
2 + λ4i∆fi + λ5i∆di + εi,
described in Section 4.1 (Eq.(12)), where ∆Si is the aggregate shock on the absolute
spread computed over the entire interval [ti − 8, ti + 8] surrounding the time ti when an
event h occurred, for h = I , I ≷ 0, I&C, or C, and where volatility shocks ∆Vi are
measured by changes in |ri|. T-statistics are computed using Newey-West standard errors.
R2a is the adjusted R
2. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for residuals’ autocorrelation,
and BP is the Breusch-Pagan chi-square statistic for residuals’ heteroskedasticity. A *
indicates that the statistic or parameter is significant at the 10% level or less.
bλ0i bλ1i bλ2i bλ3i bλ4i bλ5i R2a DW BP N
I
∆Si 8.600
∗ -0.901∗ 2.691∗ -17.879∗ 31.51% 0.50∗ 8.33∗ 86
∆Si 5.186
∗ -0.546∗ 4.949∗ -9.456∗ -0.0007 0.0035∗ 77.81% 0.75∗ 1.75 86
I > 0
∆Si 4.426 -0.411 2.198
∗ -14.459 -0.33% 0.76∗ 5.78 18
∆Si 1.570 -0.164 1.145 -0.611 0.0007 0.0046
∗ 88.00% 1.51∗ 5.49 18
I < 0
∆Si 14.930
∗ -1.596∗ 3.603∗ -20.789 72.14% 0.99∗ 1.77 68
∆Si 10.218
∗ -1.092∗ 5.198∗ -10.881 -0.0005 0.0025∗ 84.35% 1.02∗ 3.43 68
I&C
∆Si 4.534 -0.455 22.485
∗ -123.61∗ 36.30% 0.84∗ 5.90 16
∆Si 2.385
∗ -0.253∗ 16.428∗ -42.358∗ -0.0029∗ 0.0015∗ 96.33% 1.55∗ 6.53 16
C
∆Si 4.154
∗ -0.444∗ 0.741 -1.176 47.79% 0.29∗ 15.43∗ 310
∆Si 3.048
∗ -0.340∗ 6.383∗ -3.892 -0.0018∗ 0.0017∗ 59.29% 0.30∗ 37.91∗ 310
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Table 6b. Event shock decomposition: single spreads Si (j)
This table reports GMM estimates for the parameters λ0i to λ5i in the regression
∆Si (j) = λ0i + λ1iS
b
i + λ2i∆Vi (j) + λ3i (∆Vi (j))
2 + λ4i∆fi (j) + λ5i∆fi (j) + εi,
described in Section 4.1 (Eq.(13)), where∆Si (j) is the shock on the absolute spread over
each of the days ti+j surrounding the time ti when an event h occurred, for j ∈ [−8, 8]
and h = I , I ≷ 0, I&C, or C, and where volatility shocks ∆Vi (j) are measured by
changes in |ri (j)|. T-statistics are computed using Newey-West standard errors. R2a is
the adjusted R2. The statistics are defined in the notes to Table 6a. A * indicates that
the statistic or parameter is significant at the 10% level or less.
bλ0i bλ1i bλ2i bλ3i bλ4i bλ5i R2a DW BP N
I
∆Si (j) 8.004
∗ -0.839∗ -1.665∗ 5.218∗ 15.59% 0.91∗ 81.78∗ 1,462
∆Si (j) 5.640
∗ -0.577∗ 5.723∗ -1.203 -0.0021∗ 0.0002 39.21% 1.24∗ 228.9∗ 1,462
I > 0
∆Si (j) 3.105
∗ -0.279∗ 0.091 -0.378 0.82% 1.20∗ 2.76 306
∆Si (j) 1.342 -0.116 8.113
∗ -4.224∗ -0.0035∗ -0.0003∗ 37.08% 1.38∗ 55.40∗ 306
I < 0
∆Si (j) 14.903
∗ -1.607∗ -2.071∗ 19.576∗ 45.75% 1.07∗ 63.75∗ 1,156
∆Si (j) 11.426
∗ -1.222∗ 3.365∗ 12.699∗ -0.0014∗ 0.0002 54.18% 1.16∗ 169.1∗ 1,156
I&C
∆Si (j) 1.297 -0.073 -0.384 -1.768 -0.46% 1.05
∗ 2.43 272
∆Si (j) 3.081
∗ -0.314∗ 15.586∗ -11.692∗ -0.0046∗ -0.0002∗ 47.55% 1.37∗ 45.37∗ 272
C
∆Si (j) 4.109
∗ -0.440∗ 0.248 0.197 31.07% 0.63∗ 154.8∗ 5,270
∆Si (j) 4.014
∗ -0.435∗ 7.083∗ -3.766∗ -0.0020∗ 0.0002∗ 42.83% 0.69∗ 486.5∗ 5,270
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Table 7. Additional impact regression estimates
This table reports standard GMM estimates for the parameter δ0 in the regression
Xt = α+
2P
l=1
γlXt−l + δ0It (0, h) +
4P
i=1
ψiDt (i) +
1997P
k=1986
ϑkYt (k) + εt,
described in Section 3 (Eq.(2)), for each of the variables of interest Xt, from rt to ft,
defined in the notes to Table 3. bδ0 measures the impact of the events h = I , Ismall,
Ibig, Itrend, Iwind, Iexp and Iun exp (defined in Section 5) on X , after controlling for
weekday seasonalities (with day-of-the-week dummies Dt (i)) and long-term trends (with
year dummies Yt (k)). The unsigned event dummy It (0, h) and the signed event dummy
I∗t (0, h) have been described in the notes to Table 4. T-statistics for bδ0 are computed
using Newey-West standard errors. R2a is the adjustedR
2. A ˆ indicates that we replaced
It (0, h) with I
∗
t (0, h) for the event type h. A * indicates that the statistic is significant
at the 10% level or less. Estimates for the other coeﬃcients in Eq. (2) are available from
the author on request. bδ0 for diﬀerent event types h
I Ismall Ibig Itrend Iwind Iexp Iun exp
rt -0.089% 0.144% -0.026% 0.221% 0.037% 0.495% 0.009%
T-stat -0.86 1.14 -0.18 1.08 0.33 1.60 0.09
R2a 0.66%ˆ 0.69%ˆ 0.63%ˆ 0.69%ˆ 0.63%ˆ 0.80%ˆ 0.63%ˆ
|rt| 0.0489 0.0482 0.0447 0.0224 0.0562 0.0417 0.0492
T-stat 5.20∗ 5.26∗ 2.12∗ 1.55 4.91∗ 2.63∗ 4.63∗
R2a 73.13% 73.08% 73.04% 73.01% 73.13% 73.02% 73.11%
r2t 0.00005 0.00004 0.00006 0.00003 0.00005 0.00005 0.00004
T-stat 4.94∗ 4.04∗ 3.18∗ 2.30∗ 4.40∗ 3.85∗ 4.09∗
R2a 64.92% 64.78% 64.83% 64.71% 64.89% 64.73% 64.87%
St 0.0726 -0.0370 0.2698 0.0205 0.0879 0.0105 0.0829
T-stat 0.88 -0.37 1.74∗ 0.25 0.89 0.08 0.97
R2a 65.39% 65.38% 65.42% 65.38% 65.39% 65.38% 65.39%
st 6.4E-5% -0.0009% 0.0018% -0.0005% 0.0002% -0.0005% 0.0002%
T-stat 0.10 -1.05 1.75∗ -0.74 0.34 -0.49 0.28
R2a 64.47% 64.49% 64.52% 64.48% 64.48% 64.48% 64.47%
dt -30.68 -31.68 -25.41 -22.12 -32.34 -22.40 -31.61
T-stat -2.39∗ -2.31∗ -2.38∗ -2.00∗ -2.45∗ -2.54∗ -2.30∗
R2a 1.00% 0.99% 0.98% 0.98% 1.00% 0.97% 1.00%
ft 104.9 167.7 -24.84 4.53 136.2 17.66 119.3
T-stat 3.04∗ 4.19∗ -0.39 0.07 3.26∗ 0.17 3.43∗
R2a 79.44% 79.46% 79.41% 79.41% 79.45% 79.41% 79.44%
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Table 8. Additional event shock decomposition
This table reports GMM estimates for the parameters λ0i to λ5i in the regression
∆Si = λ0i + λ1iS
b
i + λ2i∆Vi + λ3i (∆Vi)
2 + λ4i∆fi + λ5i∆di + εi,
described in Section 4.1 (Eq. (11)), with ∆Si being the aggregate shock on the absolute
spread computed over the entire interval [ti − 8, ti + 8] surrounding the time ti when an
event of type h occurred, and in the regression
∆Si (j) = λ0i + λ1iS
b
i + λ2i∆Vi (j) + λ3i (∆Vi (j))
2 + λ4i∆fi (j) + λ5i∆di (j) + εi,
described in Section 4.1 (Eq. (13)), with ∆Si (j) being the shock on the absolute spread
over each of the days ti + j surrounding the time ti when an event of type h occurred,
for j ∈ [−8, 8], and where h = I, Ismall, Ibig, Itrend, Iwind, Iexp and Iun exp (defined
in Section 5). Volatility shocks ∆Vi and ∆Vi (j) are measured by changes in |ri| and
|ri (j)|, respectively. The statistics are defined in the notes to Table 6a. A * indicates
that the statistic or parameter is significant at the 10% level or less.bλ0i bλ1i bλ2i bλ3i bλ4i bλ5i R2a DW BP N
I
∆Si 5.186
∗ -0.546∗ 4.949∗ -9.456∗ -0.0007 0.0035∗ 77.81% 0.75∗ 1.75 86
∆Si (j) 5.640
∗ -0.577∗ 5.423∗ -1.203 -0.0021∗ 0.0002 39.21% 1.24∗ 228.9∗ 1,462
Ismall
∆Si 4.533
∗ -0.484∗ 6.838∗ -6.974 -0.0011 0.0034∗ 78.24% 0.91∗ 4.43 57
∆Si (j) 4.571
∗ -0.471∗ 8.931∗ -1.494 -0.0027∗ 0.0001 39.08% 1.25∗ 126.7∗ 969
Ibig
∆Si 6.243
∗ -0.628∗ 4.460∗ -12.053∗ -0.0015∗ 0.0017∗ 83.19% 0.80∗ 5.18 29
∆Si (j) 6.501
∗ -0.658∗ 2.834∗ -0.275 -0.0015∗ 0.0007 53.37% 1.25∗ 313.6∗ 493
Itrend
∆Si 6.274
∗ -0.649∗ 3.613 -6.085 -0.0005 0.0034∗ 77.15% 1.07∗ 6.71 22
∆Si (j) 6.062
∗ -0.622∗ 4.903∗ 2.812 -0.0018∗ 0.0003 37.04% 1.27∗ 52.7∗ 374
Iwind
∆Si 4.699
∗ -0.498∗ 6.399∗ -15.080∗ -0.0009 0.0034∗ 78.49% 0.87∗ 3.54 64
∆Si (j) 5.404
∗ -0.552∗ 6.511∗ -2.823 -0.0023∗ 0.0002 40.35% 1.25∗ 177.2∗ 1,088
Iexp
∆Si 7.976
∗ -0.828∗ 2.827 19.623 -0.0015∗ 0.0024∗ 82.72% 1.65∗ 3.76 13
∆Si (j) 8.401
∗ -0.850∗ 4.234∗ 10.251 -0.0024∗ -0.0003∗ 47.07% 1.36∗ 38.17∗ 221
Iun exp
∆Si 4.836
∗ -0.510∗ 4.655∗ -9.007∗ -0.0006 0.0039∗ 75.36% 0.85∗ 1.04 73
∆Si (j) 5.228
∗ -0.538∗ 5.575∗ -1.549 -0.0020∗ 0.0004 38.42% 1.19∗ 196.1∗ 1,241
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Figure 1. Number of intraday SNB transactions on CHFUSD
This figure displays the total number of interventions and customer transactions in
the sample over fifteen-minute intervals between 5:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. GMT. The
local Standard (Summer) Time zones in Zurich, London and New York are GMT+0100
(GMT+0200), GMT (GMT+0100) and GMT-0500 (GMT-0400), respectively.
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Figure 2. Activity analysis over the length of the sample period
This figure displays the mean daily number of posted indicative quotes, kft, over each
of the years k for which observations are available in our sample, for k = 1986, ...., 1998.
The light-gray 95% confidence band centered around that mean is computed using the
sample variance estimated over the corresponding one-year interval.
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800
3200
3600
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Year
D
ai
ly
 fr
eq
ue
nc
y
54
Figure 3. Weekday periodicity in the CHFUSD market
These figures plot mean values (dark lines) for the daily cumulated return (a), rt,
daily proxies for exchange rate volatility |rt| (b) and r2t (c), the absolute spread in units
of basis points St (d), the logarithmic spread st (e), and the number of posted quotes ft
(f), computed over diﬀerent days of the week, from Monday to Friday. The corresponding
95% confidence intervals are displayed in light gray. There are 670 Mondays, 669 Tuesdays,
673 Wednesdays, 671 Thursdays, and 669 Fridays in the sample of 3,352 trading days from
1986 to 1998.
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Figure 4. Cumulated impact of interventions and customer transactions
These figures plot (on the left axis) cumulated sums bξ of estimated dummy coeﬃcientsbδ, i.e., of GMM estimates of the following regression specified in Section 3 (Eq. (3)), for
each of the variables of interest Xt, from rt to ft, defined in the notes to Table 3, and for
each of the event types h, for h = I , I ≷ 0, C, C ≷ 0, or I&C:
Xt = α+
2P
l=1
γlXt−l +
8P
j=−8
δjIt (j, h) +
4P
i=1
ψiDt (i) +
1997P
k=1986
ϑkYt (k) + εt.
If, for example, w > 0 (w < 0), thenbξh−w = 8P
j=w
bδj is the estimated cumulated impact of
actions h onX up to |w| days before (after) they occurred. A ˆ indicates that we replaced
It (j, h) in Eq. (3) with the signed event dummy I
∗
t (j, h). Newey-West standard errors
for the parameters’ estimates are available from the author on request.
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Figure 4 (Continued).
d) Spread St
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Figure 5. Average spread shock measures ∆Si (j) over the event interval
This figure displays the average shock in the absolute spread,∆Si (j) = Si (j)−Sbi ,
defined in Section 5. The averages ∆Si (j) are computed over the days in the sample
where the corresponding event type h was observed. The benchmarks S
b
i for event h
are computed over the first 20 days in the sample preceding the third to last day of the
event interval that do not contain any past event of the same type. Hence, benchmarks
may be diﬀerent depending on the event type under study. We analyze subsamples of all
interventions (h = I), of all oﬃcial USD purchases (h = I > 0) and sales (h = I < 0),
all customer transactions (h = C), and of all days when transactions of both type h = I
and type h = C (all of which were CHF sales) took place (h = I&C).
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Figure 6. Additional cumulated impact of interventions
These figures plot (on the left axis) cumulated sums bξ of estimated dummy coeﬃcientsbδ, i.e., of GMM estimates of the following regression specified in Section 3 (Eq. (3)), for
four selected variables of interest Xt, i.e., rt, r
2
t , St, and dt, defined in the notes to Table
3, and for each of the following action types h = I (punctuated line), Ismall and Ibig for
size (dotted lines), Itrend and Iwind for direction (dark lines), and Iexp, and Iun exp for
market expectations (gray lines), defined in Sections 3 and 5:
Xt = α+
2P
l=1
γlXt−l +
8P
j=−8
δjIt (j, h) +
4P
i=1
ωiDt (i) +
1997P
k=1986
ϑkYt (k) + εt.
If for example h = I and w > 0 (w < 0), then bξh−w = 8P
j=w
bδj is an estimate of the
cumulated impact of oﬃcial SNB interventions on X up to |w| days before (after) these
interventions occur. A ˆ indicates that we replaced It (j, h) in Eq. (3) with the signed
event dummy I∗t (j, h). Newey-West standard errors for the parameters’ estimates are
available from the author on request.
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